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THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF EX POST
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Brianne J. Gorod ∗
Abstract: Judicial review produces disruptions to democratic preferences that are not
constitutionally required. Judicial review produces these disruptions because the law the
Court declares unconstitutional is not automatically replaced with the laws that policymakers
would have enacted had they known their preferred policy was unconstitutional. The Court is
institutionally ill-equipped to address these disruptions, and the coordinate branches are often
unwilling or unable to do so—unwilling because their membership has changed since the law
was enacted, or unable because of institutional features that make quick response difficult.
Under either scenario, these disruptions are cause for concern. Yet they are virtually
inevitable under our current system of ex post judicial review. The answer is not to abandon
judicial review, which plays an important role in our constitutional structure, but to
reconceptualize it. This Article offers preliminary thoughts on what a system of ex ante
judicial review might look like and argues that such a system would also address the policy
distortions and significant legal uncertainties caused by our current system. Recognizing that
such radical reforms are unlikely to be imminent, the Article also offers a number of more
modest proposals that could help address these greater-than-necessary democratic disruptions
in the short term. Finally, the Article argues that the Supreme Court has not taken even these
modest steps because it is unwilling to acknowledge the policy disruptions its decisions often
produce. This lack of honesty about its role may impair the Court’s ability to fill that role
effectively.
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INTRODUCTION
The most obvious facts are sometimes the least appreciated. Each
time a legislature or an agency enacts a new law or regulation, it does so
against the backdrop of the existing statutory or regulatory regime, and
its decisions about what laws are necessary or desirable are thus
informed (at least to some degree) by its understanding of what laws
already exist. 1 This fact may be obvious, but the consequences that
follow from it often are not. This Article explores one such consequence:
the significant, but not constitutionally required, disruptions to
democratic preferences that constitutional judicial review commonly
produces. These disruptions are what I call the “collateral consequences”
of judicial review.
Constitutional judicial review—which I define broadly to include any

1. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 94 (2000) (“Whenever Congress passes a
statute, it does so against the background of state law already in place; the propriety of taking
national action is thus measured by the metric of the existing state norms that Congress seeks to
supplement or supplant.”); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988) (“We
generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it
enacts.”); cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“Congress is
understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.”).
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judicial action that displaces legislative or regulatory judgment on
constitutional grounds—has been a feature of the American judicial
system for nearly as long as the system has existed. Although the origins
of judicial review are often associated with Marbury v. Madison 2 and
Chief Justice Marshall’s famous declaration that it is the province of the
judiciary to “say what the law is,” 3 Marshall was recognizing an existing
practice, not creating a new one. 4 And it is a practice that,
notwithstanding “one long dry spell,” 5 has remained a persistent feature
of our constitutional democracy ever since.
Judicial review has been the subject of significant academic attention.
Most notably, the academic community has long been obsessed with
what Alexander Bickel called the “countermajoritarian difficulty”—that
is, understanding whether (and in what circumstances) it is appropriate
for unelected judges to overturn the judgments of democratic actors.6
But the difficulty is not an insurmountable one. To many, judicial review
plays an integral role in our constitutional structure, enabling courts to
strike down statutes and regulations that are inconsistent with the
nation’s highest law, the Constitution. 7

2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 177.
4. As William Treanor has argued, “judicial review was dramatically better established in the
years before Marbury” than most have recognized. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005); cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1176–77 (1987) (arguing that the Founders intended the
courts to overrule legislative judgments based not only on the Constitution, but also on natural law).
5. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 390 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, The History]; see
also id. (noting that “the Supreme Court invalidated no national legislation [between Marbury and
Dred Scott]”).
6. See infra notes 32–43 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1046 (1984)
(“When the Court invokes the Constitution, it appeals to legal enactments that were approved by a
whole series of majorities—namely the majorities of those representative bodies that proposed and
ratified the original Constitution and its subsequent amendments. Rather than a countermajoritarian
difficulty, the familiar platitude identifies an intertemporal difficulty.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 911 (1985) (“Far from exalting
the judiciary over all, the doctrine of judicial review based on the courts’ construction of the
Constitution simply safeguarded the authority of the people who had ‘ordained and established’ the
Constitution in the first place.”); Martin H. Redish, 1990 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1340, 1349 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE
MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)) (“Since in a constitutional
democracy the only justification for judicial review by an unrepresentative governmental organ is to
ensure that the majoritarian branches adhere to the countermajoritarian limitations imposed by the
Constitution, judicial invalidation of the exercise of majoritarian will on any other grounds erodes
fundamental democratic principles.”).
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The problem, however, is when an act of judicial review produces
disruptions to democratic preferences that are not constitutionally
required. Such disruptions frequently arise for the reason I noted above.
When policymakers enact laws, they do so in reliance on the existing
state of the law. In other words, they enact some laws and not others
based on which laws seem necessary to achieve desired policy goals in
light of other laws already on the books. Thus, for example,
policymakers will not enact law Y because they think law Y is
unnecessary in light of existing law Z, which accomplishes the same
goal. This is an eminently reasonable approach to legislating, except for
one problem: when the Court strikes down law Z as unconstitutional,
constitutional law Y is not in place even though policymakers would
have enacted it had they known law Z was unconstitutional. Thus, the
Court’s decision to strike down law Z produces disruptions to
democratic preferences beyond those the Constitution requires.
Consider a more concrete example: the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. 8 In that
case, the Court held that Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, could
engage in political spending to distribute its anti-Hillary Clinton
documentary on video-on-demand during the 2008 election cycle. 9 To
reach that result, the Court held unconstitutional a federal law that
prohibited “corporations and unions from using their general treasury
funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an
‘electioneering communication’ or for speech expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate.” 10 Whether one agrees with the Court
or not, 11 it held that this disruption to democratic preferences was
required by the First Amendment. 12 But the Court’s decision produced
other disruptions to democratic preferences that were not constitutionally
required under its holding in that case. For example, one consequence of
the Court’s decision in Citizens United was arguably to allow foreign
involvement in U.S. elections in ways that were not previously
8. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9. Id. at 315.
10. Id. at 315, 310.
11. In the three years since the decision issued, a voluminous literature has developed on the
merits of the Court’s holding, as well as its broader implications. See generally Richard Briffault,
Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011); Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010);
Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
1007 (2011); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143
(2010).
12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41.
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possible, 13 even though the Court expressly left open the question
whether restrictions on such involvement would be constitutional. 14
Likewise, the Court’s decision enabled this spending to occur without
adequate disclosure, 15 even though the Court suggested that disclosure
requirements would be constitutionally permissible. 16 Again, the Court’s
decision produced these disruptions because the campaign finance
regime assumed the existence of the prohibition on corporate and union
spending; policymakers had not enacted laws they might have wanted
had they known corporations and unions would be able to engage in this
kind of political spending.
These sorts of democratic disruptions reflect the paradoxical nature
of the Supreme Court’s power. 17 Although the Court’s influence on
American society and politics is profound, 18 it has always been (and was
created to be) 19 the least powerful of the three coordinate branches of
government. 20 Its power is (in theory) limited to resolving the specific

13. Although there is some debate about whether this result necessarily follows from the Court’s
decision in Citizens United, there are strong arguments that existing law does not sufficiently
address the involvement of foreign-owned and controlled corporations in U.S. elections. See infra
notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
14. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.
15. See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
16. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
17. Alexander Bickel began his celebrated The Least Dangerous Branch by noting this paradox:
“The least dangerous branch of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful court
of law the world has ever known.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962).
18. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall
Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 787 (1999) (“Certainly the federal
judges, and especially the Justices of the Supreme Court . . . exercise an extraordinary degree of
authority over our society and culture.”).
19. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(“[I]t proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two [that] the general
liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter . . . .”).
20. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 516–17 (1987) (“Functional
approaches to matters involving the judiciary acknowledge its position as ‘the least powerful
branch’; their consistent tendency is to validate legislative choices, avoiding confrontation.”). But
see Bobby R. Baldock et al., A Discussion of Judicial Independence with Judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 355, 358–59 (1997) (discussing
the proposition that the judiciary is the least powerful branch, and not unanimously agreeing with
it); Wood, supra note 18, at 787 (“Alexander Hamilton called the judiciary the ‘weakest branch’ of
the three branches of government, but today we know better. To us not only does the unelected, lifetenured federal judiciary seem remarkably strong, but at times it actually seems bolder and more
capable than the two elective branches in setting social policy.” (footnote omitted)).
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case or controversy before it, 21 and it cannot enact rules to address gaps
or other disruptions in the law that its rulings may create. Thus, when the
Court strikes down a law, it does not put in place the additional policies
or rules policymakers would have enacted had they known their
preferred outcome was unconstitutional.
To be sure, policymakers can respond to these democratic disruptions.
The problem is that they often do not, and they rarely do so quickly. In
many cases, by the time the Court strikes down a law, the coalition that
enacted that law will no longer exist, and the new coalition may be
unwilling to respond to the Court’s decision. 22 To some, this may seem
unproblematic: if current policymakers are not bothered by the new
status quo, then perhaps no one else should be. But normally, when
policymakers enact a policy into law, that policy remains the law until
subsequent policymakers take affirmative action to repeal it.23 This
requirement ensures that there is transparency to the political process
and that positive changes in the law reflect conscious choice and
deliberate action. Our current system of judicial review turns this
process on its head, allowing democratic preferences to be disrupted
without affirmative action by the coordinate branches. To the extent
these disruptions are not constitutionally required, that should at least
give us pause.
In other cases, policymakers may want to respond, but their response
will be slow in coming for institutional reasons related to both the courts
and the coordinate branches. It will surprise no one that the coordinate
branches often fail to act quickly, and that is no less true when the courts
have disrupted democratic preferences in a way that might warrant some
legislative or regulatory response. Thus, again, the result of the Court’s
decision will be a change in the status quo that, critically, is not
constitutionally required. To some, this too may seem unproblematic
because under this scenario there will eventually be some policy
response to address the democratic disruptions. But that policy response
may be a long time in coming, and in the interim, the consequences of
these democratic disruptions may be significant.
The proper response to this problem is not to abandon judicial review,
which is an essential part of our constitutional structure, but instead to
21. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
22. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 524 (1992).
23. The one exception to this general rule is when the statutory provision compels its own
expiration through a sunset provision. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1007, 1014–21 (2011) (discussing the history of “temporary legislation”).
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reconceptualize it. After all, these problems are to some degree inherent
in any system of ex post judicial review. When the Court strikes down a
law after it has been enacted, it is often impossible to meaningfully
rectify the democratic disruptions that its decision creates. It would be
far better if the courts could provide guidance to policymakers before
they act, or at least provide broader decisions when they review a statute,
so policymakers may better understand the legal framework when they
are trying to respond.
Indeed, a system of ex ante judicial review would help address other
problems with our current system. Significantly, the prospect of ex post
judicial review can create policy distortions, as policymakers sometimes
do not enact their preferred policy (or any policy at all) because of
uncertainty about its constitutionality. 24 Moreover, our system of ex post
judicial review, combined with the iterative, case-by-case manner in
which it is exercised, often produces significant uncertainty about the
state of the law that creates difficulties for governmental actors and the
public alike. To take a recent example, when the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals held unconstitutional President Obama’s recess appointment of
several members of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), 25 the
decision created significant uncertainty not only about the validity of
actions the NLRB had taken with respect to parties not before the court,
but also actions taken by other agencies, such as the Consumer Financial
Protection Board, whose head had been similarly recess appointed. 26
One cannot help but wonder whether there might be a different—and
better—way.
This Article does not attempt to fully describe the problems posed by
ex post judicial review, or to comprehensively develop an alternative
model. But it does provide some preliminary thoughts on what a system
of ex ante judicial review might look like, while recognizing the
constitutional and practical obstacles that such reform would face. It also
offers proposals for more modest reforms that could be implemented
under our current system of ex post judicial review. Those proposals will
not completely eliminate these democratic disruptions, but may
nonetheless help minimize the problem. For example, courts could stay
their judgments for defined periods of time to give policymakers an
opportunity to respond before the decision goes into effect, thus giving
24. See infra notes 146–148 and accompanying text.
25. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
26. See generally Stephen Koff, Appeals Court Strikes Down Obama’s Recess Appointments,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/
index.ssf/2013/01/appeals_court_stikes_down_obam.html.
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policymakers an opportunity to stop these democratic disruptions before
they even occur. In some cases, it might even be appropriate for the
Court to put in place the rules that they think policymakers would have
adopted had they known the law they enacted was unconstitutional.
Policymakers could help address this problem, as well. For example,
Congress could enact more substantive fallback provisions. Such
provisions would automatically go into effect when the law to which
they are attached is held unconstitutional. Or they might adopt
streamlined procedures to facilitate quicker responses in the immediate
aftermath of judicial decisions, or engage in regular statutory or
regulatory housekeeping to ensure that attention is paid to areas in which
court action tends to produce these democratic disruptions. At minimum,
thinking through these possible solutions will help us to understand this
underappreciated consequence of judicial review, as well as what can be
done about it.
Part I provides background on judicial review, both as it is viewed in
the literature and in the courts. This background helps make clear that
although judicial review has been the focus of much attention, the topic
of this Article—the greater-than-necessary democratic disruptions it
produces—has not been.
Part II explains why these disruptions exist—how the courts create
them, and why they end up unaddressed by policymakers. It looks, in
particular, at the two different scenarios in which they arise. In some
cases, policymakers may not respond because they are not bothered by
the change in status quo the Court’s decision creates. In other cases, they
may want to respond, but immediate response is impossible. As this Part
explains, both scenarios present cause for concern.
Part III leaves the theoretical and turns to the practical. It provides a
number of concrete examples of these democratic disruptions and
demonstrates that they are not constitutionally required by illustrating
the many different ways (short of amending the Constitution) that
policymakers can respond to them.
Part IV offers preliminary thoughts on solutions. Most significantly, it
begins to imagine what a system of ex ante judicial review might look
like and explains the benefits of such a system. It also offers a number of
other proposals that may be more realistic short-term responses to this
problem. None of these proposals is perfect, but each may be appropriate
in some circumstances. At minimum, the Court and the coordinate
branches should systematically consider adopting these proposals. If
nothing else, that systematic consideration will bring more attention to
the larger complexities of our system of ex post judicial review.
Finally, Part V concludes by offering some thoughts about why the
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Court has not more regularly adopted these modest proposals. The
answer, I argue, lies in the way the Court sees its role—or at least
purports to see it. The Court wants to present itself as divorced from the
worlds of politics and policy, even though its decisions often have
profound consequences for both worlds. A little more realism about its
role could make it much easier for the Court to play that role effectively.
I.

COURTS AND COMMENTATORS HAVE PAID
INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO AN IMPORTANT
CONSEQUENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Constitutional judicial review is at once controversial and
uncontested. Although no one doubts that it is a valid exercise of judicial
authority, almost no one agrees on why and under what circumstances.
As a result, judicial review has been an almost constant source of
discussion and debate, both within the academic community and
without. I do not attempt to retread this familiar territory here, but
instead I provide a brief background on how judicial review has been
viewed by commentators and the courts. As I explain, both communities
have neglected an important part of the story: judicial review can
produce significant disruptions to democratic preferences even when the
act of judicial review is otherwise warranted. The remainder of this
Article focuses on those disruptions—and what can be done about them.
A.

In the Literature

There is a vast literature that addresses judicial review: its history, 27
its theoretical underpinnings, 28 its effectiveness, 29 its costs, 30 and its

27. See generally Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784,
1795–859 (2008); Treanor, supra note 4, at 455; William Michael Treanor, The Case of the
Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994); Wood, supra note 18.
28. See, e.g., David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723,
725 (2009) (proposing “a theory of judicial power that addresses [why] political actors, such as
presidents and legislatures, comply with acts of judicial review that limit their power” and whether
“the relationship between judicial review and popular rule [is] necessarily an antagonistic one”).
29. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
30. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154, 165
(1999) (describing the popular benefits that might result in the absence of a system of judicial
review). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1416 (2000) (responding to Tushnet’s critique of judicial review) [hereinafter Chemerinsky,
Losing].
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justifications. 31 The most significant cost, at least to many in the
academic community, is the “countermajoritarian difficulty” 32—”the
problem of reconciling judicial review with popular governance in a
democratic society.” 33 As Barry Friedman has observed, the
countermajoritarian difficulty “has been the central obsession of modern
constitutional scholarship.” 34 Although the nature of the obsession has
shifted over time—alternating between a project of justification (when
the academy likes the consequences of judicial review) and one of
critique (when the academy is less enamored of the results judicial
review produces)—the problem identified remains the same: the
purported “inconsistency between judicial review and democracy.” 35
Scholars have, of course, offered a wide variety of justifications for
the practice of judicial review. Most famously, some scholars have
offered judicial review as a means of “enforc[ing] the limits of the
Constitution.” 36 Under this view, the courts can step in to enforce the
Constitution to protect against defects in the political process.37 This is
the idea underlying the famous footnote 4 in Carolene Products, 38 which

31. See infra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
32. The term “countermajoritarian difficulty” was made popular by Alexander Bickel in 1962,
Friedman, The History, supra note 5, at 334–35; see BICKEL, supra note 17, at 16, although
concerns about the tension the term identifies predate the label, Barry Friedman, The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part V, 112 YALE L.J. 153,
157 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, The Birth] (noting that “judicial review has been criticized on and
off since at least 1800 on the ground that it interferes with popular will,” but distinguishing those
criticisms from the “intellectual problem of justifying judicial review that has gripped the academy
nonstop since the early 1940s”).
33. Friedman, The History, supra note 5, at 333.
34. Id. at 334–35; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 495 (1994) (noting that the “last generation
of constitutional scholars” is “[p]reoccupied with the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’”); Lynn A.
Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and
Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1822 (1992) (noting that “[l]iberals brood over the
‘countermajoritarian difficulty’”).
35. Friedman, The Birth, supra note 32, at 156 (“Before, judicial review was good—so long as it
was used properly. Now, judicial review is bad. The curious thing, of course, is that under either
scenario, scholars see a countermajoritarian problem . . . .”); cf. Barry Friedman, The Importance of
Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CINN. L. REV. 1257, 1257
(2004) (noting “that commentary on the Court inevitably is motivated and molded as much by
approval or disapproval of the Court’s immediate decisions as by an attempt to stand aloof from
present events and ascertain what the institution does, and whether on balance it is worth it”).
36. Chemerinksy, Losing, supra note 30, at 1424.
37. See id. at 1425 (rejecting the argument that there are “incentives for the political branches to
comply with the Constitution” because there are “instances in which the political process lacks the
incentives he describes and in which the courts have acted to uphold the Constitution”).
38. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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recognized that heightened review might be appropriate in cases in
which the operation of the political process was suspect. 39
Some scholars have rejected the view that the judiciary is particularly
well-situated to safeguard constitutional rights, but have justified the
practice on other grounds. Under one view, even if the courts are not
uniquely well-situated to protect constitutional rights, two checks (i.e.,
the courts and the policymaking branches) are better than just one (i.e.,
just the policymaking branches). 40 Under another, the courts’
institutional weakness means they can less easily take advantage of
constitutional usurpations than the other branches and will be more
likely to disapprove them. 41 This discussion of the justifications for
judicial review is only the tip of the iceberg, but provides some
indication of the extent to which scholars have struggled to reify the
practice.
To be sure, some scholars have questioned whether this obsession
merits the attention it has received. Friedman and others have argued
that there is reason to question whether judicial review is, in fact,
countermajoritarian, or at least any more countermajoritarian than the
political process itself. 42 To these scholars, whatever the theoretical
problems with judicial review, the empirical realities tell a different
story: the judicial branch often acts consistently with popular
preferences, and there is good reason to think that the political branches
(for a variety of reasons) do not. 43

39. Id. at 152 n.4.
40. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1529, 1535 (2000) (arguing “that the courts can add an additional veto to rights-restricting
government action, thereby increasing the cost of such action and decreasing the probability of its
occurrence”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1695 (2008) (“The best case [for judicial review] . . . rests instead on the subtly
different ground that legislatures and courts should both be enlisted in protecting fundamental
rights, and that both should have veto powers over legislation that might reasonably be thought to
violate such rights.”).
41. Cross, supra note 40, at 1576–77 (arguing that because “the judiciary is a weaker branch, at
least with respect to implementation of mandates, the judiciary is less likely to be able to advance
other interests at the expense of constitutional freedoms” and “[c]onsequently, the judiciary will
tend to evaluate the programs that the other branches initiate, and be more likely to disapprove of
those programs under the Bill of Rights than would the other branches”).
42. See, e.g., Friedman, The History, supra note 5, at 337–38 (citing others who have taken this
view).
43. Friedman, The Birth, supra note 32, at 166 (discussing scholarship that “strongly suggests
that legislative enactments often do not enjoy majority support, that judicial decisions often do, that
judges tend to reflect the views of the popularly elected President that appoints them, and that most
of what courts invalidate is the work not of legislative bodies anyway, but of low-level, equally
unaccountable administrative actors”).
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My purpose in this Article is not to resolve (or even join) the
controversy over this obsession, but rather to point to an aspect of
judicial review that the academic community has barely noticed, let
alone obsessed over: the extent to which judicial review produces
disruptions to statutory and regulatory schemes beyond those that are
constitutionally required under the Court’s decisions. Michael Dorf has
touched on this issue in his article on “‘fallback’ provisions”—
provisions that go into effect when a law is declared unconstitutional in
full or in part. 44 As Dorf explained, these provisions “fill[] the legal
vacuum that would otherwise exist during the time between the
invalidating decision and the enactment, if any, of new, valid
legislation.” 45 The “legal vacuum” to which Dorf refers is one
manifestation of the democratic disruptions that are the focus of this
Article, but he does not discuss these disruptions at any length because
his focus is on fallback provisions and the complications they pose as a
solution (even if a partial one) to the “legal vacuum” judicial review can
cause. 46 And beyond this reference, the legal literature has largely
ignored this important collateral consequence of judicial review.
Perhaps this oversight is not surprising because these disruptions are
in some sense orthogonal to the debates about the countermajoritarian
difficulty that have been the focus of the judicial review literature. Those
who are concerned about the countermajoritarian difficulty have focused
on reconciling the underlying tension of unelected judges overruling
elected legislators, while those who are not have focused on why there is
no underlying tension at all. Neither group has focused on the true
breadth of the disruptions that judicial review can cause.
Yet both groups should. To those who are concerned about the
countermajoritarian difficulty, these disruptions should be even more
problematic because they cannot be justified by the need to adhere to
constitutional requirements. They thus undermine traditional
justifications for the project of judicial review. To those who are not
concerned about the countermajoritarian difficulty, the traditional
explanation of why they are not concerned has not sufficiently taken
account of these consequences. Perhaps there is a case to be made that
these additional disruptions also tend to reflect majoritarian preferences,
but there is reason to suspect that might not be so. Among other things,
these consequences tend not to be transparent and thus the courts may be

44. Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 304 (2007).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 310.
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less sensitive to popular preferences. At minimum, a case should be
made.
And for members of both camps, there is an additional reason to be
aware of these disruptions, if not concerned about them. Whatever
members of the academy have to say about judicial review and its
tensions with democratic governance, the courts view the tension as a
real one, as I discuss in the next section. They recognize, of course, that
they must sometimes engage in judicial review, but they are also (at least
sometimes) reluctant to do so, perhaps in part because they recognize
that the disruptions their decisions produce will not be limited to those
that the Constitution requires. Some might champion this reluctance,
viewing it as better not to have unelected judges upending the decisions
of the elected branches. But to the extent we truly believe that the
Constitution is the nation’s highest law, we should want the courts to
enforce its requirements. If the courts are reluctant to do so,
constitutional rights may be under-recognized and under-enforced.
In the next section, I discuss a number of tools the courts have
adopted in response to this perceived tension, and explore how these
tools often lead the Court to avoid judicial review even when it might be
appropriate. As I will argue below, the Court should not seek simply to
avoid judicial review; rather, it should also work with the coordinate
branches to try to address it.
B.

In the Courts

As I just noted, the academic community is not alone in its
preoccupation with judicial review and its purported tensions with our
democratic system of government. The Court, too, has repeatedly
recognized that the proper role of the courts in a democratic society is
“limited,” 47 and that courts should hesitate before striking down the
judgments of the democratic branches. 48 This does not mean, of course,
that the pages of the U.S. Reports are filled with judicial theorizing
about the conceptual underpinnings of judicial review. But even if the
Court’s efforts to come to terms with the institution of judicial review
are often implicit, its concerns with this central tension manifests in a
number of different doctrines.
Most significant among these doctrines is the canon of “constitutional
47. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009).
48. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 157–58 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) (declaring an act
of Congress unconstitutional is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform”).
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avoidance.” Although the Court not infrequently declares laws
unconstitutional, it always first (at least in theory) considers whether it
need do so. A significant tool of statutory construction that arguably
dates back to the early nineteenth century, 49 this canon actually
encompasses “several closely related but conceptually distinct principles
of statutory construction.” 50 As perhaps most famously articulated in
Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 51
the canon (1) counsels that courts “not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of,” 52
and (2) requires courts to “first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be
avoided” before declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional. 53 The
constitutional avoidance canon is “frequently praised as a form of
judicial restraint,” 54 and the Court itself has explicitly recognized that
49. The Supreme Court has on occasion suggested that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
originated with the 1804 case Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804). See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (“In a number of cases the
Court has heeded the essence of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition in [Charming Betsy] by
holding that an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other
possible construction remains available.”). In fact, Charming Betsy involved the interpretation of a
statute so as to avoid conflict with international law, Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118, but
the general principle is arguably the same. See Note, The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and
the Preservation of Judicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1585 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance evolved
from Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy”).
50. See Ernest A. Young, Federal Courts: Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1574 (2000).
51. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
52. Id. at 347; see also, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (“[A]
‘longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.’” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)).
53. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348; see also, e.g., Clark v. Suarez-Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381
(2005) (explaining that “one of the canon’s chief justifications is that it allows courts to avoid the
decision of constitutional questions” and “[i]t is a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190 (1991) (“[A]s between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other
valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.” (citation omitted)). There is some
disagreement in the case law regarding whether the canon should be invoked whenever there are
“serious doubts” about the constitutionality of the statute, or only when it is actually
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Clark, 543 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The modern canon of
avoidance is a doctrine under which courts construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional
doubts, but this doctrine has its origins in a very different form of the canon. Traditionally . . . it
commanded courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional
and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.”).
54. Young, supra note 50, at 47; see also Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding Avoidance: Why Use of the
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constitutional avoidance follows from the “principle of judicial
restraint” 55 and “is followed out of respect for Congress.” 56
Constitutional avoidance is not the only tool of self-restraint in the
judiciary’s arsenal. To the contrary, the courts have over time developed
many doctrines that enable them to decide not to decide. These “passive
virtues,” as Alexander Bickel called them, 57 provide the courts with
means of avoiding the political fray and the interbranch conflict that
politically contentious decisions will often produce. 58 Political question
doctrine, for example, cautions the courts to avoid addressing questions
that are textually committed to the other branches for decision. 59
Although courts may resort to these tools for many reasons beyond their
relationship with Congress, that relationship nonetheless remains an
important reason that courts exercise restraint.
Even when it cannot avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds,
the Court will often try to decide it on the narrowest constitutional
ground possible. For example, the Court has long recognized that facial
challenges to laws are disfavored; in other words, the Court would prefer
to strike down a particular application of a law than to invalidate it
entirely. 60 Although there are “several reasons” for this practice, the
Court has explained that one of them is that “[f]acial challenges . . . run
contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts
should neither ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it’ nor ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be

Constitutional Avoidance Canon Undermines Judicial Independence—A Response to Lisa
Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 (2006).
55. E.g., Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2031.
56. Rust, 500 U.S. at 191; see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439,
445 (1988) (“A fundamental and long-standing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts
avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).
57. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 113.
58. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1998) (“These passive virtues consist of a number of clever decision
avoidance techniques that permit judges to refrain from deciding cases rife with the potential to
generate serious interbranch conflict.”); Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 114, 132 (2009) (“In Bickel’s view, the practice of unelected judges weighing the legality of
legislative acts poses a profound challenge to the majoritarian characteristics of the American
democracy. The passive virtues, he argued, work as a powerful counterpoint to this challenge.”
(footnote omitted)).
59. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing various ways to identify cases
involving political questions).
60. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008)
(explaining why facial challenges are disfavored).
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applied.’” 61 Moreover, “facial challenges threaten to short circuit the
democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people
from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.” 62
Thus, the Court is clearly sensitive to the “countermajoritarian
difficulty” that has so beguiled the academic community. But, like the
academic community, it has not focused, at least explicitly, on the
disruptions that are the focus of this Article. As a result, the Court has
focused on avoiding judicial review, rather than addressing it once it
occurs. 63 The remainder of this Article explores why that current focus is
insufficient—and offers preliminary thoughts on what we might do
about it.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW PRODUCES DEMOCRATIC
DISRUPTIONS THAT ARE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED

Despite all of the academic hand-wringing over judicial review, it is
an institution that is plainly here to stay. And, as I noted earlier, there are
good reasons for this: when a legislature or agency enacts a law that is
inconsistent with the Constitution, judicial review is an important means
of ensuring fealty to our nation’s highest law. 64 The problem is that

61. Id. at 450 (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
62. Id. at 451; see also id. (“We must keep in mind that ‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.’” (quoting Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006)).
63. The exception to this general rule is the severability doctrine. See generally Kevin C. Walsh,
Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738 (2010) (tracing the history of modern
severability doctrine). Under that doctrine, a court may “excise any unconstitutional clauses or
applications from a statute, leaving the remainder in force if the legislature would prefer that result
to the statute’s total invalidation.” David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 639, 639 (2008). Severability also refers to the idea that “courts presume that the
constitutionally valid applications of statutes should be severed from any constitutionally invalid
applications, leaving the valid applications in force, unless Congress would not have intended the
valid applications to stand alone.” Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950
(1997). Although severability can minimize the consequences of judicial review, it does not address
judicial review’s collateral consequences. See infra Part II.A.
64. There is, of course, an ever-growing literature on the extent to which other institutions can—
and should—also play a role in interpreting the Constitution. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher
D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270
(1996) (noting that “the structural, historical, and normative case for ‘departmentalist’ constitutional
interpretation—for the federal legislative, executive, and judicial departments each having an
obligation, in the exercise of its granted powers, to interpret and apply the Constitution—is now
familiar” (footnote omitted)). But this literature does not undercut the view that the judiciary plays
an important role in ensuring fealty to the Constitution.
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judicial review does not just disrupt constitutionally invalid laws; it also
produces disruptions to democratic preferences that are not
constitutionally required. In this Part, I explore why that is and the two
distinct scenarios in which these disruptions may arise.
A.

Explaining Collateral Consequences

As I noted at the outset, legislators and regulators act, at least to some
degree, with knowledge of the existing state of the law, and their
decisions about which laws are necessary and which are not are
informed by that knowledge. 65 As a result, policymakers will not enact
some laws that might be desirable and constitutional because existing
laws are already designed to achieve essentially the same result. That is,
policymakers will not enact law X (a prohibition on felons transporting
any firearms across state lines) because law Y (a prohibition on all
people transporting firearms across state lines) already exists. This
allocation of resources is sensible and efficient so long as law Y exists.
But if law Y is struck down (on Second Amendment grounds, for
example), 66 that decision creates a gap in the intended legal framework,
arguably one that is not constitutionally required.
Consider a simple example. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 67 the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a regulation promulgated by the
Massachusetts Attorney General which prohibited
[o]utdoor advertising [of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products], including advertising in enclosed stadiums and
advertising from within a retail establishment that is directed
toward or visible from the outside of the establishment, in any
location that is within a 1,000 foot radius of any public
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school
or secondary school.” 68
The Court concluded that the regulation violated the First
Amendment because the “broad sweep of the regulations indicates that
the Attorney General did not ‘carefully calculate the costs and benefits
associated with the burden on speech imposed.’” 69 But just because the
65. See supra note 1.
66. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2009),
this is an entirely plausible result. See id. at 573, 626–27 (recognizing an individual right to bear
arms under the Second Amendment, but noting that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”).
67. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
68. Id. at 535–36.
69. Id. at 561 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)).
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1,000-foot ban was unconstitutional did not mean that a 500-foot ban
would have been, or one that was more narrowly tailored or more
carefully justified. Yet Massachusetts had not enacted any of those other
regulations because none was necessary so long as the 1,000-foot ban
was on the books.
The Supreme Court, of course, did not put in place any of these
constitutional alternatives when it struck down the 1,000-foot ban.
Although Marbury recognized the power of the courts to “say what the
law is,” 70 the courts “say what the law is” in a very different way than
legislatures do. 71 The courts do not, generally, craft positive law; that
responsibility rests with members of the executive and legislative
branches. The courts are supposed to limit themselves to resolving
disputes about the law, 72 and any law they do make is supposed to be
incidental to that function of dispute resolution. 73 As a result, when the
Court decides a case, its role (under current Supreme Court doctrine) is
generally limited to deciding the particular question that the parties bring
to it. It is not appropriate for the Court to consider all of the various
ancillary consequences that may result from its decision. For example, it
is not generally for the Court to query whether its decision leaves gaps in
the law or requires other changes to make its legal decision work in the
real world, even if the Court’s decisions do in fact often require such
changes.
Even if the Court could identify these consequences, it will often be
difficult for the Court to determine how best to address them. After all,
the Court can hardly be expected to predict with accuracy how Congress
or other policymakers would want to respond to those consequences. 74
As Michael Dorf has noted, “[c]ourts would balk at constructing, out of
70. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
71. See, e.g., Krotoszynski supra note 58, at 2–3 (noting that “most academics and judges have
viewed the legislative role as quite separate and distinct from the judicial role”).
72. See, e.g., Chris H. Miller, The Adaptive American Judiciary: From Classical Adjudication to
Class Action Litigation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 117, 129 (2009) (describing the courts’ focus on dispute
resolution). See generally Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms & Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 23 (2002); (describing how judges create new law); Ellie Margolis, Beyond
Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197,
221 (2000) (“Judges employing the common law method most obviously and legitimately make law
and policy.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1915, 1920 (1986) (“It is a judge’s obligation to decide private disputes. If, as part of that process,
interpretation of the constitutionality of statutes is required, so be it.”).
74. See Dorf, supra note 43, at 305 (noting that “each institution has at best a limited ability to
predict or control how the other will respond to its work product”).
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whole cloth, the nearest constitutional thing to a provision they have just
invalidated, for that seems a quintessentially legislative task.” 75
It is worth noting that severability, the doctrine the Court most
commonly invokes after it has held a law unconstitutional, does not
address this problem. When the Court invokes the severability doctrine,
it excises one part of a law from the rest, invalidating the
unconstitutional provision but allowing the remainder of the law to
stand. 76 Although that act does limit the consequences that follow from
the Court’s exercise of judicial review, it does not change the fact that
some provision of the law was invalidated—and that policymakers
might have enacted additional (or different) laws had they known that
provision would not exist.
Of course, at first blush, it might seem unproblematic that
policymakers would have enacted different laws had they known their
preferred outcome was unconstitutional. After all, policymakers can
always enact these new or different laws after the Court has acted. The
problem is that the policymaking branches generally cannot respond
quickly—and sometimes they will not respond at all. In the remainder of
this Part, I discuss these two scenarios and explain why we should care
about the democratic disruptions that are produced in each of them.
B.

Scenario I: Legislative Lag

To start, there is nothing inherently problematic about an act of
judicial review producing disruptions to democratic preferences that are
not constitutionally required. The Court may not be able to address those
disruptions, but Congress or other policymakers can act where the Court
cannot. The problem, however, is that policymakers rarely act quickly. 77
Be they regulators or legislators, federal or state, they are unlikely to
respond in an expeditious manner to an act of judicial review. 78
75. Id. at 311. According to Dorf, “European constitutional courts sometimes avoid this difficulty
by ordering the legislature to craft new, valid legislation.” Id. at 311 & n.28 (citing Gerald E.
Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and
Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 274–78 (1995)).
76. See supra note 63.
77. Dorf, supra note 44, at 304 (noting that there is often a “legal vacuum . . . during the time
between [a judicial decision invalidating legislation] and the enactment, if any, of new, valid
legislation”).
78. I focus here on responses by Congress, but there is no reason to think that responses by
federal regulators or state policymakers will be any quicker. If anything, they may take longer to
respond. The slowness of the regulatory process is often noted, see, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic
Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1020 (2000)
(noting that “regulatory action has slowed or halted because of extensive procedural requirements”),
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As an initial matter, policymakers cannot respond to acts of judicial
review unless they are aware of them. Although one might expect there
to be regular communications between the courts and the coordinate
branches, the opposite is more nearly true.79 To be sure, Congress will
be aware of the most high profile of the Supreme Court’s decisions:
when the Court announced its decision in the health care reform cases
the Term before last or the same-sex marriage cases last Term, 80 no one
was unaware of what was happening at One First Street that day. But
even at the Supreme Court, blockbuster, high-profile cases are the
exception, not the rule. And even if Congress is generally aware of what
the Supreme Court is up to, there is much less reason to have confidence
that all state legislatures (many of which are not even full-time 81) follow
the goings-on at the U.S. Supreme Court quite so closely.
But even if we assume that policymakers are aware that the Court has
acted in a way that might warrant some policy response, immediate
response will still be rare. There are all sorts of reasons for this fact, not
all of which need be discussed fully here. But a few key facts illustrate
the point. To start, Congress will rarely be able to devote all of its
energies to any one issue, even an important one. There will be other
items on its lawmaking agenda and other obligations, such as oversight,
that consume its energies. Thus, it may take time for the legislative
process to even get underway. And once underway, the process itself
will take time. Schoolhouse Rock may be able to describe how a bill
becomes a law in just three minutes, 82 but it is in fact a lengthy process
in which procedure and politics often work together to tie up bills in
and action by state legislatures that are often part-time and have small staffs may also be slow in
coming.
79. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 74 (1997); see also id. (“[J]ust as
Congress is largely unaware of the courts’ decisions, anecdotal evidence suggests that the judiciary
tends not to know of congressional activities that relate to its work.”); Robert A. Katzmann,
Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political
Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 655 (1992) (“Anecdotal evidence—a view commonly held across the
political and judicial spectrum and especially by those with experience in both branches—suggests
that all too often the first and third branches do not fully appreciate one another’s concerns.”).
80. See United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry,
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
81. See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Disclosure, Credibility, and Speech, 27 J.L. & POL. 627, 631
(2012) (noting that “[m]any state legislatures are part-time”).
82. Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast 1975), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyeJ55o3El0. National Public Radio’s updated version may
provide a somewhat more accurate—although equally brief—account of the legislative process.
How a Bill Becomes a Law . . . These Days, ON THE MEDIA (Mar. 26, 2010),
www.onthemedia.org/2010/mar/26/how-a-bill-becomes-a-law-these-days/.
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committees for weeks or months before they get a vote (if they ever get
one). 83 Some scholars have likened the legislative process to “a
procedural obstacle course that favors opponents of legislation and
hinders proponents.” 84 And it has become an even more arduous
obstacle course in recent years, as members of Congress use procedural
devices to prevent the passage of legislation that enjoys majority support
in both houses. 85 Finally, when Congress is closely divided, successful
legislation will require careful—and time-consuming—negotiations. 86
To some extent, this legislative inertia is not a bad thing. Indeed, we
might not want policymakers to respond to a judicial decision without
fully studying it and considering its implications, both to understand
what policy responses are desirable and to consider whether those policy
responses are constitutional under whatever new precedent the Supreme
Court has just created. Careful study of the question may be particularly
necessary where the Court strikes down a complicated or long-standing
statutory scheme, 87 or where the new legislation Congress is considering
83. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1994) (“The initiation,
negotiation, and enactment of a statute is a multidimensional process that requires committing
considerable institutional resources, navigating politically sensitive internal procedures, and
anticipating substantial societal consequences.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 83, 98 (1994) (noting that “the committee system reinforces congressional inertia that bogs
down most legislation”). See generally DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 144 (1997).
84. ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 230 (5th ed.
1996); see also id. at 229–60.
85. The filibuster, for example, is an often used tool of obstruction on the Senate floor. See
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1401, 1418 (2010). See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181 (1997). And the filibuster does not just make it more difficult to pass the legislation that is
being filibustered; it also makes it more difficult for the Senate to accomplish anything else. See,
e.g., Ezra Klein, What Is a ‘Hold’?, WASH. POST, (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:37 AM),
voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/02/what_is_a_hold.html (“Even if you can crush every
one of these filibusters without breaking a sweat, you’ve still just seen a whole week—or maybe
much more—of the Senate’s time chewed up.”); Charles A. Stevenson, Stevenson: In Senate,
‘Motion to Proceed’ Should Be Non-Debatable, ROLL CALL (Apr. 19, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/55_117/-45256-1.html.
86. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 83, at 114 (“Congressional adoption of a statute usually
requires legislators to build a coalition of interest groups that may have different or even conflicting
statutory goals.”); see also Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J.
380, 380–81 (describing the compromises involved in passing a specific piece of legislation).
87. The confusion over Citizen United’s effect on the ability of foreign-owned and controlled
corporations to participate in domestic elections is evidence of this fact. That confusion was most
powerfully demonstrated at the 2010 State of the Union when President Obama criticized the Court
for “revers[ing] a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests—
including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections,” and Justice Alito
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might raise its own constitutional issues. 88
But whatever the causes, this period of legislative lag means that the
Court’s decision will go into effect without any legislative response.89 It
may well be that in some cases this period of legislative lag is
inconsequential, but in other cases it may be quite significant, especially
depending on the nature of the democratic disruptions and the length of
the lag.
C.

Scenario II: Political Change

In the preceding section, I assumed that policymakers wanted to
respond to the Court’s decision, but that institutional features of
legislative action made a quick response difficult. But this assumption
will not always be a good one. In many cases, policymakers may not
want to respond because the policymakers currently in office are not the
ones whose legislative or regulatory scheme was disrupted by judicial
action. After all, when the Court engages in judicial review, it will
almost always be years after the particular law was enacted. Indeed, this
delay is inherent in our system in which laws are often not challenged
until after they have gone into effect, and in which cases slowly work
their way through the court system. During this intervening period, there
demonstrably indicated his disagreement by appearing to mouth “not true.” See, e.g., Justice Openly
Disagrees with Obama in Speech, NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:19 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35117174/ns/politics-white_house/t/justice-openly-disagrees-obamaspeech/#.UgQQA5L2Z5d. Compare Zachary Roth, Reformers: Court Decision Creates ‘Huge
Opening’ for Foreign Companies to Sway Elections, TPMMUCKRAKER (Jan. 25, 2010, 1:03 PM),
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/01/reformers_court_decision_creates_huge_ope
ning_for.php, with Bradley A. Smith, Citizens United We Stand, AM. SPECTATOR, May 20, 2010,
available at http://spectator.org/archives/2010/05/07/citizens-united-we-stand. Although it was not
entirely clear which part of the President’s statement Justice Alito was responding to, many
commentators understood Alito to be responding to the President’s assertion about the decision’s
impact on foreign spending. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Alito vs. Obama—Who’s
Right?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 28, 2010, 7:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/commentaryalito-vs-obama-whos-right/ (assuming “without hard proof” that “Justice Alito was reacting to the
President’s discussion of the potential role of foreign corporations in American politics”).
88. Cf. Dorf, supra note 44, at 308–09 (“[W]hen Congress or a state legislature scripts its
response to a prospective decision overruling its output in advance of that ruling, it cannot possibly
take account of whatever points the courts will make in the future discussion.”).
89. See, e.g., Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say What You
Mean & Mean What You Say, 66 MISS. L.J. 37, 76 (1996) (“Congress’s institutional responses are
slow and difficult. The concept that if the courts make incorrect decisions, Congress regularly can
correct those mistakes in a timely manner is unrealistic.”); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 46 (1991) (noting that there are
“obstacles to overriding the courts” and “even when the legislature does override a court’s statutory
construction, such legislative action takes time, and, in the meantime, the judicial construction is
binding law”).
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will often have been one or more elections, and the political composition
of the executive and legislative branches will have changed. Even if the
coalition that enacted the now-invalidated provision might have wanted
to respond to the act of judicial review, the new powers-that-be may like
the disruptions to democratic preferences that the Court has wrought.
Indeed, they may view it as a gift; the work of their forebears has been
destroyed without the expense of any political capital to repeal the law. 90
Some people who are bothered by the outcome in Scenario I may
view this scenario as relatively unproblematic. If the elected branches
are unconcerned about these democratic disruptions, then there really is
no democratic disruption at all. Or so the theory goes. But this response
ignores a simple fact: in our legal system, the preferences of the
coalition that enacted a law are supposed to persist until new
policymakers revisit the issue. 91 Thus, if a law is on the books, and
current policymakers do not like it, they cannot just wish it away; they
need to repeal it through the processes of bicameralism and
presentment. 92 That process ensures transparency and provides a basis
for public discussion about the issue. It also encourages accountability
because the public knows who is responsible for the enactment of the
law, and for its repeal. These values are compromised, if not lost
entirely, when judicial review produces democratic disruptions that are
not constitutionally required, and there is no response at all by the
democratic branches.
Thus, we should not be sanguine about the possibility that democratic
disruptions are blessed by democratic inaction. Rather, democratic
disruptions in the Scenario II category may present different issues than
democratic disruptions in the Scenario I category, but they too warrant
greater attention than they have previously received.

90. Of course, it will often be difficult to know for sure whether legislative inaction is deliberate,
or simply the result of the various factors that produce Scenario I legislative lag.
91. See, e.g., Susannah Landes Foster, Note, When Clarity Means Ambiguity: An Examination of
Statutory Interpretation at the Environmental Protection Agency, 96 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1363 (2008)
(noting that “often a future Congress will not want to defend the duly enacted laws of a previous
Congress. Those laws remain valid, however, until they are repealed through a statute that
undergoes bicameralism and presentment”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (1990) (“At least rhetorically, the Court views its role as implementing
the original intent or purpose of the enacting Congress.”).
92. Indeed, it is black-letter law that implied repeals are disfavored. United States v. Fausto, 484
U.S. 439, 461 n.9 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The presumption disfavoring implied repeals
has been a part of this Court’s jurisprudence at least since 1842.”).

06 - Gorod Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

926

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/10/2013 5:07 PM

[Vol. 88:903

III. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN PRACTICE
In the prior Part, I argued that judicial review often produces
disruptions to democratic preferences that are not constitutionally
required. These disruptions are not just a theoretical problem; they are a
practical reality. In this Part, I illustrate the many different kinds of
disruptions that are not constitutionally required (and thus may be
remedied without resort to a constitutional amendment) by providing a
typology of the ways in which policymakers can respond to instances of
judicial review short of attempting to amend the Constitution. My
purpose here is not to assess whether any particular response is
appropriate in any given case, but simply to show that none of these
consequences of judicial review can be justified on the ground that it is
constitutionally required. This Part, although it does not even approach a
comprehensive treatment of the instances in which these greater-thannecessary democratic disruptions have arisen, should nonetheless
provide some sense of the frequency with which such disruptions can
occur when the Court engages in judicial review.
A.

Trying Again (Through Constitutional Means)

Although it is common to think that a judicial declaration of
unconstitutionality leaves policymakers with no recourse but
constitutional amendment, 93 policymakers can often respond in much
more substantive (and effective) 94 ways. After all, even where the Court
has held that a specific law or practice is unconstitutional, there will
often be ways in which legislators or regulators might have been able to
effectuate the same policy goals (or at least much of those goals) had
they known that their top preference was unconstitutional. 95 As Michael
93. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 194
(2012) (“A Supreme Court decision interpreting the Constitution can be overturned only by a new
decision or by a constitutional amendment.”).
94. Amending the Constitution is no easy task. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 427 (1983)
(noting that “a brief review of the history of the amendment process lends support to the argument
that amending the Constitution is not so easy that courts should infer additional, nontextual
requirements from article V”).
95. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, James Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1137, 1137 (2005) (reviewing J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN
CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004)) (noting that
“[j]udicial review is often thought to be an absolute veto, killing legislation with no hope of
resurrection,” but that “[c]reative and persistent legislators will try to reanimate these statutory
corpses, and it is an open question whether judicial disapproval really lays the issue to rest”).
Although these policy responses are in a sense an attempt to overrule the Court’s decision, they
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Dorf has explained, when a court invalidates a law, even if it severs
other provisions, it still “sacrifices everything that [the constitutionally
invalid provision] accomplished.” 96 Thus, “[i]f there were some
constitutionally valid way to achieve much of what [the invalid
provision] achieved,” that “would be preferable from a policy standpoint
to” leaving the severed provisions standing alone.” 97
In some cases, legislators can simply reenact the same legislation,
either in full or partial form. After all, there are a number of
constitutional doctrines that turn on the purpose underlying the
legislation, the evidence that policymakers amass to support the need for
it, or how tailored the government’s remedy is to the identified
problem. 98 For example, any time the Court considers whether a law can
survive challenge under some form of heightened scrutiny, the Court
will consider both the government’s interest in enacting the law and
whether the evidence that supports the need for the legislation (and its
ability to effectively serve that need) can satisfy the appropriate standard
of review. 99 Thus, Congress may sometimes be able to make previously
unconstitutional legislation constitutional by providing additional
justifications or changing it in only minor ways. For example, in the case
of the Massachusetts prohibition on outdoor advertising of tobacco
products, 100 the state might have been able to re-enact this law by
offering a more robust explanation for the breadth of the ban and why it

nonetheless recognize the new legal constraint that exists on their authority. They are thus
categorically different than when Congress simply “disregard[s] by act or omission any
unwelcomed interpretation.” Luke M. Milligan, Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on
Judicial Review, 45 GA. L. REV. 211, 236 (2010).
96. Dorf, supra note 44, at 313 (emphasis in original).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and
the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2008) (“Numerous
constitutional doctrines, most notably in the areas of free speech, due process, and equal protection,
demand that statutes be ‘narrowly tailored.’”); id. at 44 (“When a reviewing court evaluates the
legality of a government decision challenged on constitutional or other grounds, the court may
consider whether the responsible government decisionmaker has developed an adequate explanation
of the basis for its decision, often in the form of a record or report containing detailed evidence and
analysis.”); id. at 50 (“Judicial attention to disfavored explanations for government policy choices is
particularly notable in the context of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.”).
99. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (“Because
the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government
interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. The State must specifically identify an ‘actual
problem’ in need of solving, and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the
solution.”).
100. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
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was necessary, or it might have been able to provide additional evidence
of the problem and why alternatives to a broad ban would have been
insufficient to address the problem.
Relatedly, sometimes Congress can address a constitutional
deficiency merely by showing that it is sensitive to the constitutional
limits on its power. For example, in United States v. Lopez, 101 the
Supreme Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act, which
made it unlawful to “knowingly . . . possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.” 102 According to the Court, the statute was not a valid exercise of
Congress’s Commerce power because, in part, it “contain[ed] no
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce.” 103 The next year, Congress re-enacted the law, adding the
jurisdictional element, which required that the firearm “ha[ve] moved in
or . . . otherwise affect[ed] interstate or foreign commerce.” 104 Because
virtually all guns have “moved in or . . . otherwise affect[ed] interstate or
foreign commerce,” the amendment did not meaningfully change the
statute, yet the addition of this language has proven sufficient for it to
survive challenge, at least in the courts of appeals. 105
And even if policymakers cannot justify the exact same law, they may
be able to justify a more tailored one. For example, in the case of the ban
on outdoor advertising of tobacco products, Massachusetts might have
adopted a ban of 250 feet or 500 feet to replace the 1,000-foot ban that
was struck down. After all, there can be little doubt that, if forced to
choose, the Attorney General would have preferred a more limited ban
to none at all. In fact, even though this decision was directed at a
Massachusetts regulation, Congress effectively responded to it many
years later when it gave the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco
products. In the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act, 106 Congress authorized the FDA to re-promulgate its outdoor

101. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006)).
103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
104. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. A, sec. 657,
§ 922(q)(2)(A), 110 Stat. 3009-369, 3009-372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(2)(A) (2000) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006))).
105. United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Danks,
221 F.3d 1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006))).
106. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
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advertising regulations with whatever modifications were necessary in
light of intervening First Amendment jurisprudence, including
Lorillard. 107
Regardless of whether policymakers try to reenact the same law or a
similar one, the fact that the Court has struck down one means of
achieving a policy goal may spur policymakers to think more creatively
about other ways to achieve it. After all, often policymakers will choose
a particular legislative path not because it is the only way to achieve the
desired policy, but because it is the cheapest one or perhaps the most
politically feasible. 108 In the absence of the easiest or cheapest
alternative, they may well decide to invest additional resources in
alternative means of achieving the policy goal. To return to the tobacco
regulation, for example, the inability to limit tobacco company’s
advertisements may have prompted Massachusetts to think about other
steps it could take to discourage youth smoking, such as spending more
on its own public education campaign and imposing harsher penalties for
selling tobacco products to minors.
To consider another example, as the constitutional validity of
affirmative action programs appeared to be in danger, policymakers
started to think more creatively about ways they could accomplish the
same aims as race-based affirmative action without relying specifically
on race. For example, in the context of higher education, class-based
programs and top 10% programs were adopted as ways to avoid the
strictures on programs that take account of race.109 When the Supreme
107. Id. § 102(a)(2)(E), 123 Stat. at 1831 (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to publish a final rule which shall be identical to the one promulgated in 1996 except that it
may “include such modifications to section 897.30(b), if any, that the Secretary determines are
appropriate in light of governing First Amendment case law, including the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in [Lorillard]”).
108. For example, if the Court had not upheld the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act,
Congress could have achieved the same broad policy goals by establishing a single-payer system, as
Justice Kennedy suggested at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs. v. Florida, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398Tuesday.pdf (“Let’s assume that it could use the tax power to raise revenue and to just have a
national health service, single payer.”).
109. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the
Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290 (2001) (discussing the adoption of top
percent programs in Texas, California, and Florida after each “lost the ability, or thought it soon
would lose the ability, to consider race when making university admissions decisions”); Richard D.
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1060 (1996) (“If Adarand
invalidates many current race-based programs, and if the major alternatives in the political debate
over affirmative action are unsatisfactory, then there are strong moral, political, and legal reasons
for those concerned about remedying the legacy of past discrimination to back a new plan for classbased affirmative action.”).
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Court decided in Grutter v. Bollinger 110 that some forms of race-based
affirmative action are permissible, 111 there was presumably less need to
focus on those sorts of programs. If the Court were to one day overrule
its decision in Grutter, 112 many policymakers would presumably respond
to that decision by launching new and different types of non-race-based
affirmative action.
Finally, sometimes Congress will both try to re-enact the law and also
search for alternative means to achieve the same policy results. For
example, following the Court’s decision striking down Congress’s
attempt to limit minors’ access to “indecent” materials on the Internet,
Congress both enacted a new law aimed (albeit unsuccessfully) at curing
the constitutional infirmity of the original,113 and also passed a law that
tried to address the problem in a slightly different way, using Congress’s
spending clause power to limit minors’ ability to access such materials at
public libraries. 114
Thus, the Court’s determination that a law is unconstitutional does not
mean that policymakers cannot still achieve its ultimate goal. The
problem, as I discussed earlier, is that it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to pass that alternative legislation after the Court acts. As I
discuss in the next Part, it would be preferable if policymakers could
know in advance that their preferred means of achieving the policy goal
was unconstitutional, so they could simply enact an alternative
(constitutional) law in the first place.115
B.

Addressing Other Policy Vacuums

Even where the Court’s decision makes it difficult to achieve the
exact policy goal of the invalidated provision, policymakers can still
110. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
111. Id. at 343.
112. Last Term, the Court declined to overrule Grutter, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, __U.S.__, No.
11-345 (June 24, 2013), but it arguably made it more difficult for universities to implement racebased affirmative action, see, e.g., Olatunde Johnson, Fisher’s big news: No big news,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013 11:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=165811 (noting that
Fisher “preserved Grutter’s core holding,” but that “Justice Ginsburg in her dissent argued that the
Court’s application of strict scrutiny was in fact too strict”).
113. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, 1999, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU¸ 542 U.S. 656 (2004); ACLU v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009).
114. Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, sec. 1701-1703, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000) (providing that public libraries could lose federal funding if they did not place filters on
publicly-accessible computers).
115. See infra Part IV.
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often achieve many of the provision’s aims. A couple of examples
illustrate the point.
As I noted at the outset, in Citizens United, the Court held
unconstitutional a ban on corporations and unions making independent
expenditures from their general treasury funds. 116 That the Court’s
decision would allow corporations and unions to engage in spending that
the campaign finance regime did not previously allow was obvious—and
necessary given the Court’s view of the First Amendment. But the
Court’s decision produced other significant disruptions that were not
constitutionally required because the entire campaign finance scheme
had depended on (or at least assumed) the existence of this broad
prohibition on corporate and union spending. In other words, that
prohibition had obviated the need for other, more specific prohibitions
on election spending—prohibitions that remained completely lawful
after Citizens United. For example, policymakers might have wanted to
limit foreign corporate spending in domestic elections. Indeed, there is
reason to think that they did, 117 and that such a limitation would have
been constitutional. 118 Yet Citizens United disrupted that preference
because the prohibition on corporate spending was the provision that
had previously prohibited spending by foreign-owned and controlled
corporations. As a Congressional Research Service report explained,
“U.S. corporations with some degree of foreign ownership or control
were prohibited from directly making campaign expenditures under 2

116. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
117. Federal law currently prohibits “foreign national[s]” from “directly or
indirectly . . . mak[ing] . . . an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an
electioneering communication.” 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2006); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp.
2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)] readily passes constitutional muster”), aff’d, __
U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
118. The majority noted that it “need not reach the question whether the Government has a
compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s
political process,” explaining that the provision in issue would be “overbroad” even if the Court
assumed that the Government had such a compelling interest. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
362 (2010). Rick Hasen has argued that he has “little doubt that the Court would uphold [foreign
spending] limitations” even though, in his view, “it is difficult to see how any of the arguments
supporting a foreign spending limit could be squared with the reasoning of the majority in Citizens
United.” Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
609, 606 (2011); see also Testimony Submitted to the United States Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Heather K. Gerken), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/News_&_Events/gerkentestimony020210.pdf (“While it is
possible that the Court will hold that companies controlled by foreign nationals—like domestic
firms— enjoy a robust First Amendment right to engage in independent expenditures, it is more
likely that the Court will find that protecting U.S. elections from the influence of foreign nationals is
a legitimate state interest, sufficient to justify appropriately tailored regulations.”).
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U.S.C. § 441b prior to Citizens United because of their status as
corporations, not because of their foreign ties.” 119 In its absence, foreignowned corporations can arguably act without restraint.
Policymakers might also have wanted to ensure that any new
corporate and union spending was fully disclosed. Again, the Court did
not suggest that such disclosure requirements would be constitutionally
problematic. To the contrary, the Court suggested otherwise. 120 Yet
adequate disclosure and disclaimer requirements were not on the
books—arguably, the need for them had not been so great prior to the
Court’s decision in Citizens United—and so corporate and union
spending could proceed apace without those requirements.121
On the other end of the political spectrum, consider Roe v. Wade. 122
In Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that the “right of personal
privacy” implicit in the Constitution is “broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” and thus
held unconstitutional state laws that criminalized all abortions, except to
119. L. PAIGE WHITAKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41096, LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 9 (2010); see also Matthew
Mosk, Democrats Writing Bill to Bar Foreign Money from U.S. Political Campaigns,
ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/democrats-bar-foreign-money-uspolitics/story?id=9658403 (one Democratic congressman noting that there is “a big danger that the
decision opens the door to foreign owned corporations indirectly spending millions of dollars to
influence the outcome of U.S. elections through their American subsidiaries”). The prohibition on
spending by “foreign principal[s]” is insufficient to address this problem because the term “foreign
principal” is defined to include “a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other
combination of persons organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a
foreign country.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3) (2000). Thus, it does not, by its terms, include corporations
organized under the laws of the United States that are owned or controlled by foreigners. There are,
of course, arguments one could make to try to bring such expenditures within the scope of this
provision. For example, one could argue that a foreign national who owns or controls an American
corporation that makes an independent expenditure is indirectly making the expenditure. Or,
alternatively, one could argue that federal regulations proscribe such participation. See 11 C.F.R.
§ 110.20 (2004) (“A foreign national shall not direct, dictate, control, or directly or indirectly
participate in the decision-making process of any person, such as a corporation, labor organization,
political committee, or political organization with regard to such person’s Federal or non-Federal
election-related activities . . . .”). But there is no reason to feel confident that either of these
arguments would prove successful.
120. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366.
121. See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, Don’t Blame the Supreme Court for Citizens United—Blame
Congress, the FEC and the IRS, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 24, 2012, 9:14 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/24/citizens-united-supreme-court-montanachallenge_n_1313579.html (“The Citizens United decision strongly affirmed the need for full
disclosure of political donations. But by taking advantage of a gaping loophole left open by
legislative and administrative inaction, political operatives from both parties are actively soliciting
and receiving unlimited amounts of money in absolute secrecy, simply by claiming to be nonprofit
groups devoted to social welfare.”).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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preserve the life of the mother. 123 But, again, this decision created other
disruptions to democratic preferences. For example, policymakers might
have wanted to impose consent requirements or waiting periods—
restrictions on the availability of abortion that the Court strongly
signaled might be constitutional in its decision.124 After all, for many
states that had statutes broadly criminalizing abortions prior to Roe,
there had been no need for laws that placed more specific constraints on
when and how abortions could be obtained after the first trimester and
after viability. Thus, just like the absence of prohibitions on foreign
spending in U.S. elections after Citizens United, after Roe there was an
absence of prohibitions that may well have been favored by many
legislators and that were perfectly lawful under the Court’s holding.
That many legislatures would have preferred some restrictions on
abortion to none at all not only makes sense, but is also borne out by
history. For example, the year after the Court’s decision in Roe,
Massachusetts passed “‘[a]n act to protect unborn children and maternal
health within present constitutional limits.’” 125 That act “required an
unmarried minor . . . to obtain the consent of both of her parents in order
to terminate a pregnancy by abortion.” 126 Although the Supreme Court
ultimately struck down the statute, the Court did outline for the
Massachusetts legislature how it could draft a similar law that would
survive constitutional scrutiny. 127 Moreover, in the years since Roe,
many states have enacted other abortion regulations, such as spousal

123. Id. at 152–53, 166.
124. Id. at 154 (explaining that “this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation”); id. at 155 (noting that a state statute limiting the right to
abortion might survive if it could be justified by a “compelling state interest”). To provide some
guidance to lower courts in reviewing such restrictions, the Court established the famous trimester
framework, id. at 164–65, which was subsequently altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
125. Meryl A. Joseph, Note, The Massachusetts Parental/Judicial Consent Law for Minors’
Abortions: Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1992)
(quoting 1974 Mass. Acts 706 § 1 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (1990))). Prior to
Roe, Massachusetts law provided that
“[w]hoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman, unlawfully administers to her,
or advises or prescribes for her, or causes any poison, drug, medicine or other noxious thing to
be taken by her or, with the like intent, unlawfully uses any instrument or other means
whatever, or, with like intent, aids or assists therein, shall . . .” be punished.
Kudish v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 248 N.E.2d 264, 265 n.1 (Mass. 1969) (quoting MASS GEN.
LAWS ch. 272 § 19).
126. Joseph, supra note 125. If both parents would not consent, the law did allow a minor to go to
the courts, but a judge could allow the abortion only for “good cause shown.” Id. (quoting Baird v.
Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 849 (D. Mass. 1975)).
127. See id. at 1065; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
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consent requirements and waiting periods. 128
Citizens United and Roe are hardly anomalous. Given the costs of
legislative and regulatory action, legislators and regulators will rarely
enact laws and regulations that are superfluous in light of other laws
already on the books. And thus it will often be the case that when the
Court strikes down one statute, there will be disruptions to democratic
preferences that could have been addressed by other statutes had
policymakers known they were necessary.
C.

Facilitating Changes

Even in those cases where policymakers are not bothered by the
Court’s decision, they may still want to respond to ensure that it can be
implemented successfully and without causing new problems. In other
words, the Court’s decision may have produced a need for new laws that
did not previously exist.
Again, Citizens United provides an example. There, the Court rejected
the Government’s argument that “corporate independent expenditures
can be limited because of [the government’s] interest in protecting
dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political
speech.” 129 In other words, individuals might invest in a company
hoping to see economic returns and instead find that their money was
being used to support political causes with which they did not agree. The
Court acknowledged the abstract legitimacy of the concern, but rejected
it as a practical matter, noting that “[t]here is . . . little evidence of abuse
that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of
corporate democracy.’” 130 Yet the Court did not assess whether the
existing procedures of corporate democracy were actually sufficient to
prevent such abuses; and, given that there used to be a broad prohibition
on corporate political spending, there is reason to think that existing state
laws may not have been sufficiently robust to address this problem.
Thus, policymakers may have wanted to enact new shareholder
protections to ensure that the Court’s decision did not create abuses of
the corporate form.

128. Michael Grimm, Comment, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren: California’s
Parental Consent to Abortion Statute and the Right to Privacy, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 463,
469 (1995) (“Several states reacted to Roe’s broad holding by passing legislation concerning
peripheral abortion issues, such as waiting periods, spousal notification, and parental consent.”
(footnotes omitted)).
129. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010).
130. Id. at 361–62.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 131
provides another example. In that case, the Court announced a new
protection for criminal defendants, but in so doing, may have produced
disruptions to the workings of criminal administration in many states. In
Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was convicted of cocaine trafficking and
distribution based, in part, on three “certificates of analysis” showing the
results of forensic analysis performed on the substances. 132 This
evidence was admitted without the testimony of the lab analyst who
performed the analysis, and the defendant argued that its admission
violated the Confrontation Clause, which provides criminal defendants
with the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against [them].” 133
The Court ultimately agreed, concluding that the evidence and “the
documents at issue in this case fall within the ‘core class of testimonial
statements,’” 134 and thus the Confrontation Clause required the live
testimony of an analyst familiar with the forensic work. 135 The
dissenting justices condemned the Court’s decision, inveighing against
what they viewed as the deleterious consequences it would produce on
criminal proceedings. According to the dissent, “the Court threatens to
disrupt forensic investigations across the country and to put prosecutions
nationwide at risk of dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent
instances when a particular laboratory technician, now invested by the
Court’s new constitutional designation as the analyst, simply does not or
cannot appear.” 136
Although the Court questioned whether these practical consequences
were a valid factor to consider in assessing the constitutionality of a
practice, 137 they also thought the dissent’s practical concerns were overblown because states could adopt measures to address them. For
example, they noted that many states have so-called “notice-anddemand” statutes that “require the prosecution to provide notice to the
131. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
132. Id. at 308.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
134. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310.
135. Id. at 311 (“Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to ‘be confronted
with’ the analysts at trial.” (emphasis in original)).
136. Id. at 340–41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 325 (majority opinion) (“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of
criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—is
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”).
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defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after
which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to
the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at
trial.” 138 But the Court did not identify all of the states that have such
statutes or limit its holding to those states. There is reason to think that
many states may not have had them, given that before Melendez-Diaz,
there would have been no need unless that state’s constitution required
live testimony in this context. Thus, policymakers might have wanted to
enact such laws to prevent the disruptions that the Court’s new rule
could otherwise produce.
IV. REFORMING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Having recognized that judicial review often produces greater-thannecessary democratic disruptions, the critical question remains—what, if
anything, can be done about them. As should be clear from the
discussion thus far, these disruptions are in some sense inherent in our
current system of ex post judicial review: the courts are institutionally
ill-equipped to address these disruptions, and policymakers are
institutionally ill-equipped to respond quickly, if they choose to respond
at all. But the answer, I argue, is not to abandon judicial review. It is to
reconceptualize it. Ex ante judicial review would preserve for the
judiciary its integral role in our constitutional structure without
producing these greater-than-necessary democratic disruptions. Of
course, the path to ex ante judicial review is not an easy one, as I discuss
below. Thus, I also propose interim reforms that are more feasible in the
short term. None of these interim reforms offers a complete solution to
the problems of ex post judicial review, but at minimum, they would
help focus attention on the issue and the need for solutions.
A. Toward Ex Ante Judicial Review
As I noted at the outset, judicial review has been a feature of the
American legal system for nearly as long as there has been an American
legal system. 139 And as long as there has been judicial review, it has
been ex post, relying on courts to step in after the law has been enacted
and (often) gone into effect. There are certainly advantages to this
approach, not least among them that it means the courts will not expend
time adjudicating questions until the coordinate branches have actually
138. Id. at 326.
139. See supra note 4.
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expended the resources necessary to enact the policy into law. But it
does mean that by the time the court has declared a law unconstitutional,
it will often be difficult, if not impossible, to recapture the democratic
preferences that would have existed had policymakers known that their
preferred outcome was unconstitutional.
The answer to these problems is not to abandon judicial review
altogether. After all, judicial review is an integral part of our
constitutional structure, offering one of the few mechanisms to ensure
that everyday enactments of the nation’s policymaking bodies are
consistent with the dictates of the nation’s highest law. Nor is the answer
to rely on constitutional avoidance tools to reduce the incidence of
judicial review because, as previously discussed, those tools avoid
judicial review even where it is arguably necessary.
Instead, the answer is to make judicial review less necessary by
preventing the enactment of unconstitutional laws and regulations in the
first place, and I propose here two reforms that could help make that
happen. First, a more liberal approach to justiciability requirements
might enable policymakers to ask the Court for its views as to a
proposed law or action’s legality before policymakers act. 140 Although it
may arguably be difficult for the Court to address such abstract
questions and there may be inefficiencies if policymakers ultimately
decide not to adopt the policy for other reasons, the availability of this
advice would help prevent the enactment of unconstitutional laws, and
policymakers could thus put in place their next best outcome in the first
instance. Second, even if the Court did not want to consider questions
about laws that have not yet been enacted, the Court could still provide a
more holistic assessment of a statute and its constitutionality when one
part of the law comes before it through the normal channels. Even if this
reform would provide less advance guidance to policymakers than
advisory opinions, it would nonetheless provide a much richer
understanding of the existing legal framework when they need to
respond to judicial decisions.
140. For recent decisions strictly applying justiciability requirements, see Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (“The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines that
reflect [the Article III “cases” and “controversies” requirement]. It requires federal courts to satisfy
themselves that ‘the plaintiff has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy”
as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.’” (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted)); National Park Hospitality Association v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–
08 (2003) (“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance
of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.’” (citations omitted)).
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My goal here is not to sketch out precisely what either of these
reforms would look like. After all, any detailed proposal would benefit
from a comprehensive study of the advisory opinion practices and
justiciability requirements in the states and abroad, 141 a project that is
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say for present purposes,
that such a comparative study would provide a number of different
models from which such a system could borrow to ensure that the
structure of the system is one in which the Court is not overburdened
and is able to adequately address the legal issues before it. It would also
help highlight the costs of such a system, so we can meaningfully assess
how those costs balance against the benefits, and try to design a system
that maximizes benefits while minimizing costs.
There is, of course, nothing novel about suggesting that it would be
good to avoid unconstitutional laws before they are enacted or to ensure
that policymakers understand the legal framework against which they
are legislating. After all, these are presumably always important goals.
Policymakers—or at least legislators—have a constitutional obligation
to safeguard the Constitution and are supposed to heed constitutional
strictures whenever they act. 142 And offices like the Office of Legal
Counsel at the Department of Justice provide guidance on whether
proposed legislation and regulations suffer from some constitutional
infirmity. 143 But these existing procedures are obviously insufficient to
141. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (2001) (explaining that “some state courts play an explicit
and accepted advisory role in their relations with the other branches”); Krotoszynski, supra note 58,
at 29 (“The practice of the states demonstrates that advisory opinions are not inherently inconsistent
with maintaining a proper separation of powers.”); Jonathan D. Persky, Note, “Ghosts that Slay”: A
Contemporary Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155 (2005).
142. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (recognizing that “Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to
uphold the Constitution”); see also Dorf, supra note 44, at 342 (“[I]n our constitutional system,
elected officials as well as judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution.”). Of course,
policymakers may sometimes (for political or other reasons) vote for laws that they actually do not
want to see go into effect, but there is reason to doubt that policymakers will generally act in so
strategic a fashion. See Stephenson, supra note 98, at 24–25 (explaining that “caveats
notwithstanding, it seems implausible to suppose that legislators are systematically indifferent to the
fate of the statutes they pass” because, among other things, “to the extent that legislators care about
advancing a policy agenda, they will have an interest in enacting statutes that actually become
law”).
143. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1189, 1244 (2006) (explaining OLC’s “bill comment” practice in which “OLC reviews bills
introduced in Congress for potential constitutional problems” and “[w]hen a potential constitutional
problem arises, OLC produces a short bill comment identifying the problem,” and “[a]nother
executive branch office then puts the bill comment together with policy commentary from other
offices and forwards the whole package on to Congress”).
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alert policymakers to what the courts will decide, 144 and they provide
little help when policymakers know that there is some question about the
constitutionality of the new law, but want to test constitutional limits, as
they will sometimes legitimately want to do.
An ex ante approach to judicial review could also help address other
costs imposed by ex post judicial review and justiciability constraints.
Specifically, the courts’ iterative manner of decisionmaking makes
policy response more difficult because it creates significant uncertainty
about the future development of the law—an uncertainty that may be
largely unproblematic when all law is made by common law courts, but
is considerably more problematic when other actors also participate in
the development of the legal framework.
As an initial matter, this uncertainty means that policymakers cannot
fully understand the legal framework within which they are operating, 145
and the results of the legislative (or regulatory) process may be altered as
a result. Most significantly, policymakers may factor predictions about
what the courts will do in the future into their decisions about what
policies to adopt in the present. Scholars have written about the “policy
144. To be sure, the policymaking branches are sometimes aided by judicial statements in cases
that have already been decided. In Heller, for example, the Court observed that
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). But those statements can sometimes
mislead policymakers, as they are not binding on the Court itself or even lower courts. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1023, 1046 (2005) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003))
(“The significance of Boerne was augmented by the Court’s cutting back on dicta in its famous
1966 decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan that had suggested Congress could go beyond the Court in
protecting Fourteenth Amendment rights.” (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, there will not always be
such statements relevant to the particular policies the coordinate branches are considering.
145. To be sure, legislators almost always act against the backdrop of some amount of legal
uncertainty, but a recent Supreme Court decision in the field highlights that uncertainty and may
also encourage additional litigation in the area. The Supreme Court decision itself may also, in fact,
introduce new uncertainty by raising—but not addressing—new questions about how the law should
operate, imposing vague standards, or otherwise failing to elucidate specifically how the law will
work in the future. Justice Scalia recently noted just this feature of the Court’s development of the
law, observing in the context of cases addressing the Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel that “[t]oday’s opinions deal with only two aspects of counsel’s pleabargaining inadequacy, and leave other aspects (who knows what they might be?) to be worked out
in further constitutional litigation that will burden the criminal process.” Lafler v. Cooper,
__U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. (“Is it constitutional, for
example, for the prosecution to withdraw a plea offer that has already been accepted? Or to
withdraw an offer before the defense has had adequate time to consider and accept it? Or to make
no plea offer at all, even though its case is weak—thereby excluding the defendant from ‘the
criminal justice system’?”).
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distortion” that can result when legislators operate in the shadow of
judicial review and try to anticipate whether and why the Court might
strike down a pending bill. 146 As Mark Tushnet has explained, “[p]olicy
distortion occurs when, due to judicial review, legislators choose
policies that are less effective but more easily defensible than other
constitutionally acceptable alternatives.” 147 More specifically, policy
distortion will generally occur when “courts, exercising the power of
judicial review, say something about what the Constitution requires, and
legislators somehow improperly take what the courts have said into
account as they shape policy.” 148 This policy distortion can take different
forms. In some cases, policymakers might not enact their preferred
policy because they think it is unconstitutional (or at least that the courts
will declare it to be) and adopt some less preferred policy in its place. In
other cases, policymakers may decide that their preferred policy is
constitutionally infeasible and simply decide that the next best option is
not worth the time and effort it will take to enact it.
This iterative lawmaking also creates a related, but distinct form of
uncertainty that can discourage legislative or regulatory response—
namely, the possibility of additional changes in the area of law that may
alter what response is appropriate. In other words, even if lawmakers do
not fear that any new law or regulation they enact will be struck down,
they may nonetheless be concerned that future changes in the law will
supersede their efforts to create a stable public policy. Rather than
having to legislate in the same area in piecemeal fashion year after year,
policymakers might prefer to wait until there is a stable legal framework
against which they can make policy.
The recent litigation surrounding campaign finance regulation
provides a perfect example of how one act of judicial review can prompt
additional ones, sometimes ones that have an even greater impact on the
area of law than the original decision. As I discussed earlier, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United allowed corporations and
unions to make unlimited independent expenditures from their general
146. See generally Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative
Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995).
147. Id. at 250; see also Note, Advisory Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over
American Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2064, 2065 (2011) (explaining that “because the
legislature cannot know ahead of time whether plausibly unconstitutional statutes will be struck
down or left standing, it must discount the expected value of such proposals by the probability of
their not being invalidated in deciding how to expend its limited political capital,” and “[a]ll else
equal, this makes legislation that the Court might strike down less attractive to Congress, and so less
likely to be enacted, than constitutionally unproblematic legislation” (footnote omitted)).
148. Tushnet, supra note 146, at 259.
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treasury funds. In SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 149 the D.C. Circuit relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United and
concluded that the government could not limit individual contributions
to independent expenditure groups. 150 As the court explained,
[i]n light of the Court’s holding as a matter of law that
independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or
create the appearance of corruption . . . . Given this analysis
from Citizens United, we must conclude that the government has
no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to an
independent expenditure group. 151
This decision led to the development of the so-called Super PAC,
which spends money “independent[ly]” of candidates and thus can raise
funds without legal limits. 152 As has been widely discussed, Super
PACs played a significant role in the 2012 Republican primary and will
presumably continue to play a major role in elections going forward. 153
If Congress or the Federal Election Commission had acted immediately
following Citizens United, it would not have known to address this
significant additional alteration in the legal framework of campaign
finance regulation. 154 A system of ex ante review would address these
issues.
Finally, our system of ex post judicial review creates significant legal
uncertainties while cases are being litigated—uncertainties that can
make it difficult for governmental actors and the public alike. There are
not just the obvious uncertainties that exist while a case is slowly
working its way through the court system. During that period, the
government and the public will act in the shadow of the law, even

149. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
150. Id. at 694–95.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 562 & n.40 (2012)
(reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT (2011); JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT
WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011)).
153. See generally, Bob Biersack, Outside Spending: The Big Picture (So Far),
OPENSECRETSBLOG, (Jun. 11, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/06/outsidespending—-the-big-picture.html.
154. Indeed, such additional changes were not difficult to predict. See Kang, supra note 11, at
243 (“Although the immediate public reaction focused on the potential for increased corporate
spending in elections, the much larger importance of the case is the signal from the Court about the
direction of campaign finance law going forward.”).
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though there is a non-trivial possibility that the law will not ultimately
be upheld. 155 There are also the uncertainties that exist when a court
decides one case that applies only to the specific parties before it, but
may have application to many other parties. 156 To be sure, parties will
often have to act with some uncertainty about the law—what it means,
how it applies in some new context, whether it might change 157—but the
question is whether an alternative model of judicial review could
eliminate at least some of that uncertainty. Again, there seems reason to
think that it might. 158
Admittedly, adopting an ex ante form of judicial review—be it
advisory opinions or broader review of statutes implicated by more
traditional cases—would be no small change. Either reform would
require a significant reconceptualization of the way we think about
Article III’s requirements, as well as a practical restructuring of the ways
in which the courts operate. To start, both of these suggestions would
run afoul of Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, at least as it
has come to be interpreted. 159 But it is worth noting that Article III’s
constraints are largely court-developed. 160 The Constitution itself, of
155. See TOOBIN, supra note 93, at 270 (explaining that Principal Deputy Solicitor General Neal
Katyal did not try to delay the appeal in the health care cases because federal agencies “were
spending tens of millions of dollars a month preparing to implement the ACA. It was simply
irresponsible to let the legal uncertainty around the law linger”).
156. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
157. Complete certainty is almost surely unattainable. The Court can always overrule itself, see
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[I]t is
common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’ and certainly it is not
such in every constitutional case.” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))), and changes in the membership of the Court will often produce
doctrinal changes, see generally TOOBIN, supra note 93. Nonetheless, a decision from the Court
provides greater certainty than no decision at all.
158. Persky, supra note 138, at 1160 (explaining that advisory opinions are used because of
“positive externalities that are ever-present, but largely unheralded,” and discussing an example in
which one “provided much-needed finality in a politically charged, time-sensitive public dispute”).
159. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“When the federal judicial power is
invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government, the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers prescribed by
the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by Article III.”); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (“The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or
otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party . . . .”).
160. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion, 29
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 173, 203 (2002) (“Given the Anglo-American practice in the eighteenth century,
the Constitution’s cases or controversies requirement might have been interpreted to encompass
advisory opinions . . . .”); Note, supra note 147, at 2067 (“This construction of the federal judicial
power was not inevitable. In addition to the numerous advisory opinions given by the early Justices,
English judges had a longstanding practice of issuing advisory opinions upon the monarch’s
request.”).
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course, speaks in broad and amorphous terms, providing no content to
the requirement that there be a “case or controversy.” And there is no
express prohibition on advisory opinions, or any other procedure that
might facilitate broader judicial resolution of disputes. There is also
reason to question whether these constraints actually achieve the
practical benefits that are attributed to them161—namely, ensuring that
the courts have all of the information necessary to resolve disputes.162 It
is thus at least worth considering whether we might be better off with a
more cabined understanding of the “case or controversy” requirement
and a renewed focus on other tools that might better ensure that courts
do not exceed their proper role in a democratic society.
Of course, putting aside the constitutional restraints, these approaches
would also require significant adjustments in the way the courts
operate—or at least in the ways we tend to conceive of courts operating.
After all, the courts depend (in theory) on the parties to provide them
with all of the information they need to accurately and fairly resolve
disputes. But as has been discussed elsewhere, this notion that the courts
rely on the parties is more myth than reality, born of the courts’
unwillingness to acknowledge that they are often forced to make
decisions of the type that lawmaking bodies make. 163 Because the
adversarial system—at least as currently structured—is ill-suited to
providing the courts with the facts that they need to resolve these kinds
of disputes, they often look beyond the parties to find them, and as a
result, rely on factual claims that have not been subject to adversarial
testing (or any testing at all).164 Thus, the courts are already looking
beyond the parties, and they are already in need of adjustments in their
structure to help them do so better. Indeed, the Court frequently appoints

161. Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Fact-Finding, 61
DUKE L.J. 1, 69–70 (2011).
162. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional
Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1291, 1302 (1986) (identifying “two main purposes to the advisory opinion ban: ensuring an
adversarial presentation of actual disputes in order to receive proper judicial process and promoting
finality of judicial action essential to the maintenance of separation of powers within the national
government” (footnotes omitted)); see also Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1002–03 (1923) (arguing against advisory opinions on the ground that “[t]he
stuff of [current constitutional] contests are facts, and judgment upon facts. Every tendency to deal
with them abstractedly . . . is bound to result in sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”
(footnote omitted)).
163. Gorod, supra note 161, at 4, 10–11; see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59
DUKE L.J. 447, 451 (2009) (“Neither courts nor legal commentators have acknowledged the many
institutionalized judicial practices that seem to undermine the norm against issue creation.”).
164. Gorod, supra note 161, at 53–55.
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counsel to represent positions that have been abandoned below; 165 it
could similarly appoint individuals to represent the two sides in such
controversies. Moreover, numerous state courts, unburdened by the
supposed constraints of Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement,
allow for advisory opinions and have found ways to make an advisory
opinion practice work. 166
I do not attempt to resolve here the constitutional debates or to
provide a comprehensive description of what an alternative model of ex
ante judicial review might look like. Instead, my point is simply that it is
time to consider what such a model might look like, if only because too
little attention has been paid to how features of our system of ex post
judicial review can hurt both the courts and the coordinate branches. At
minimum, it seems worth considering why our constitutional structure
pronounces courts the final arbiters of constitutional disputes and then
disables them from broadly resolving disputes about the meaning of the
Constitution in an efficient manner.
B.

Changing the Court

While I believe we should think broadly about how our current
system of ex post judicial review works—and does not work—I have no
illusions that the radical reforms I just discussed will happen quickly.
Nor should they. It will take time to work through the practical and
constitutional objections I touched on above. While we begin to work
through these broader issues, it is important to think about what, if
anything, can be done in the meantime to address these greater-thannecessary democratic disruptions. In fact, there are a number of steps the
Court could currently take to help address these disruptions.
None of these solutions is perfect—indeed, each arguably entails
some costs or dangers—but each may nonetheless be better than the
status quo, at least in some cases. And the virtue all of these solutions
share is that the Court has on occasion done each of these things,
suggesting that they could be implemented under our current system of
ex post judicial review. Whether it adopts any one of them (and which
one it adopts) will vary depending on the specifics of the case, but the
simple act of systematically considering these solutions will not only

165. See generally Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici
Curiae To Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011).
166. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (2001) (“[S]ome state courts play an explicit and accepted
advisory role in their relations with the other branches.”).
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provide partial solutions in some cases, but will also help further the
larger conversation about these disruptions and our current system of
judicial review.
1.

Transparency, Advice, and Communication

It is impossible to address the democratic disruptions produced by
judicial review without first acknowledging them. Yet the Court rarely
does. Even though the very purpose of judicial opinions is to make the
Court’s work more transparent, 167 it often remains quite opaque—not
just in terms of how the Court reaches its decisions, but also in terms of
what those decisions actually mean. Indeed, rather than attempting to
shed light on instances in which judicial review may warrant legislative
or regulatory response, the Court more often does just the opposite,
glossing over or ignoring altogether the significant disruptions that its
decisions produce. But it need not be this way. The Court could use the
judicial opinion as a means of alerting policymakers to the consequences
of its actions and even identifying various ways in which policymakers
might want to respond.
The Court is, after all, often equipped to provide policymakers with
this type of information. When the Court decides an issue and writes its
opinion in the case, it will have just studied the legal issue in great depth.
Although this study will not always lead to an appreciation of the
broader legal context surrounding the issue, it often will. Indeed, the
broader context—and the practical consequences of various outcomes—
will often be identified by amici, 168 and relevant to the Court’s ultimate
decision in the case. 169
Indeed, the Court as an institution, and individual members of the
Court in dissenting opinions, will sometimes engage in just this sort of
judicial action—discussing the consequences of decisions or calling on
policymakers to respond to decisions that they believe are misguided.
Neal Katyal has described this judicial practice of “recommend[ing],

167. See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A Critique of Eisenberg’s
The Nature of the Common Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 557 (1991) (noting that “[j]udicial
decisions and opinions may educate the legislature and public”).
168. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 987 (2009) (“There has been no shortage of praise in the
legal literature for the ability of amicus briefs to inform the court of implications of a decision or to
point out unintended consequences for people or groups not party to the suit.” (citation omitted)).
169. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1990) (“It
is difficult to argue to Americans that in evaluating a political theory they should ignore its practical
consequences.”).
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but . . . not mandat[ing], a particular course of action based on a rule or
principle in a judicial case or controversy” as “advicegiving.” 170 The
Court—or more commonly dissenting members of the Court—will
sometimes go even further, encouraging Congress to act in response to
judicial decisions that they believe have misinterpreted the law. In
Ledbetter v. Good-Year Tire & Rubber Co., 171 for example, Justice
Ginsburg wrote a lengthy dissent, criticizing the majority’s interpretation
of Title VII and calling on Congress to correct its error. 172 Noting that
the Court had previously “ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII,”
and that Congress had addressed the problem with new legislation, she
remarked that “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991,
the Legislature may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of
Title VII.” 173 To be sure, Ledbetter was a statutory construction case—
not a constitutional one—but if the Court and its members will call on
Congress to act when the Court is doing nothing more than giving its
best understanding of Congress’s intent, it makes that much more sense
for the Court to do so when the Court is indisputably disrupting that
intent. To be sure, the Court cannot force Congress or regulators to do
anything—policymakers can decide whether (and how) they want to
respond—but that does not seem reason for the Court to stay silent when
it knows some action might be appropriate.
The Court has on occasion done this. In District of Columbia v.
Heller, 174 for example, the Court invalidated the District of Columbia’s
ban on handguns, concluding that it violated the Second Amendment. 175
In reaching that conclusion, the Court acknowledged “the problem of
handgun violence in [the] country” and claimed to “take seriously the
concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of
handgun ownership is a solution.” 176 The Court responded to this

170. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1710 (1998). Often the
Court will engage in this sort of advicegiving as an alternative to engaging in judicial review,
declining to strike down a law, but identifying what the Court views as the potential problems with
it. As Katyal has explained, “advicegiving is a natural adaptation in a world in which judges fear
deciding issues due to the countermajoritarian difficulty.” Id. at 1711 (emphasis in original); see
also id. (“[T]hose jurists who want to avoid interference with legislative power announce narrow
holdings, but superimpose broad advice (a form of dicta) by fully explicating the rationale and
assumptions behind the decision.”).
171. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
172. See id. at 643–61 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 661.
174. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
175. Id. at 635.
176. Id. at 636.
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concern by noting that its decision “[left] the District of Columbia a
variety of tools for combating that problem, including some measures
regulating handguns.” 177 It then pointed to an earlier portion of the
opinion in which it identified laws that the opinion had described as
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” 178 Likewise, in the Court’s
decision striking down Congress’ second attempt to limit minors’ access
to harmful materials on the Internet, the Court noted that filters provide
an available alternative and observed that “Congress can give strong
incentives to schools and libraries to use them” and “could also take
steps to promote their development by industry, and their use by
parents.” 179
Finally, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 180 the Court held that schools could not classify students
by race for the purpose of making school assignments. 181 In concurrence,
Justice Kennedy took issue with the plurality’s suggestion that “state and
local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools,” 182 suggesting that
[s]chool boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through [means other
than the one invalidated], including strategic site selection of
new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition
of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. 183
The Court should more systematically provide just this sort of
guidance and should make its existence clearer to the policymakers who
are the intended recipients. 184
The Court could also facilitate policymakers’ ability to address
177. Id. at 636; see also id. at 626–27 & n.26.
178. Id. at 627 n.26.
179. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004).
180. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
181. Id. at 710–11.
182. Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
183. Id. at 789.
184. To be sure, problems can arise when courts try to use dicta to make law. See, e.g., Pierre N.
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1260 (2006).
But as even Judge Leval acknowledges, “dicta often serve extremely valuable purposes . . . . They
can assist future courts to reach sensible, well-reasoned results. They can help lawyers and society
to predict the future course of the court’s rulings.” Id. at 1253. What he identifies as “problematic is
not the utterance of dicta, but the failure to distinguish between holding and dictum.” Id.
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judicial review by sending the relevant policymakers their opinions
when they decide to engage in this advicegiving (or even when they do
not, but still believe that some policy response might be appropriate). To
be sure, there will be many cases in which the mere announcement of the
Court’s decision will be sufficient to alert Congress and other
policymakers to the fact that their attention might be warranted. But in
other cases policymakers (particularly state legislatures or agencies with
smaller staffs) might be largely unaware that the Court has acted in a
way requiring their attention. By affirmatively sending its opinion to
these policymakers, the Court would make clear both that it has taken
action that might require those policymakers’ attention and that they
should read the Court’s opinion in case it has guidance about the types
of action that might be warranted.
2.

Staying Judgments

As I discussed earlier, greater-than-necessary democratic disruptions
are a function of both judicial action and legislative inaction—or at least
delayed action. Although greater transparency and communication
between the branches may facilitate somewhat quicker responses from
policymakers, immediate action will nonetheless remain difficult in
many cases and impossible in others (for example, where the appropriate
response is regulatory and the procedural strictures of the Administrative
Procedure Act require notice-and-comment). 185 But if it is not possible
for policymakers to act more quickly, it may be possible for the Court to
act more slowly—specifically, the Court could facilitate policymakers’
ability to respond to these democratic disruptions by staying its
judgments for a defined period of time, thus enabling policymakers to
act before these democratic disruptions are realized.
As an exercise of the Court’s equitable powers, 186 such action would
not be that different than lower courts’ decisions to stay their judgments
to give higher courts time to consider an issue.187 It would also not be
185. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
186. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (“[T]he
comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a
clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is
to be recognized and applied.”).
187. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for example, provide the courts of appeals with
the authority to “shorten or extend the time [to issue its mandate],” FED. R. APP. P. 41(b), and the
courts of appeals will not infrequently extend the time to issue the mandate to prevent “disruption”
to the actors that will be affected by the court’s decision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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that different than courts leaving an invalid regulation in place while the
agency considers what action to take in response to the court’s
decision. 188 Staying the judgment in a case could also be viewed as a
form of case management—the inherent power courts, including the
Supreme Court, 189 enjoy to manage their dockets, determine how to
calendar their cases, and decide how long to wait before issuing a
decision. Indeed, the Supreme Court has occasionally adjusted its
schedule to permit Congress time to address an issue with legislation. 190
On a few occasions in the past, the Court has done exactly what I
propose—announcing its decision, but at the same time staying its
judgment to allow for a response from policymakers. In Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 191 for example,
the Court considered whether “the assignment by Congress to
bankruptcy judges of the jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 . . . by
§ 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates Art[icle] III of the
Constitution.” 192 The Court held that bankruptcy judges were not
“Art[icle] III judges” because they did not “enjoy the protections
constitutionally afforded to Art[icle] III judges,” 193 and that bankruptcy
jurisdiction could not be placed with non-Article III judges. 194
The Court recognized that it was not its place to attempt to restructure
the bankruptcy system—“[w]e think that it is for Congress to determine
the proper manner of restructuring the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to
conform to the requirements of Art[icle] III in the way that will best
188. In deciding whether to vacate “an inadequately explained agency action,” the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considers “whether (1) the agency’s decision is so deficient as to raise
serious doubts whether the agency can adequately justify its decision at all; and (2) vacatur would
be seriously disruptive or costly.” N. Air Cargo v. USPS, 674 F.3d 852, 860–61 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
189. Notwithstanding the traditional practice of resolving all of the cases heard in a term before
the term’s end, the Court will sometimes depart from that practice when it decides the benefits of
greater deliberation or additional argument outweigh the benefits of a more expeditious decision.
See, e.g., Herbert Brownell, Essay, Civil Rights in the 1950s, 69 TUL. L. REV. 781, 783 (1995)
(“Several months later, near the end of the Supreme Court term in June 1953, instead of handing
down a decision, the Court issued an order setting the Brown case for reargument in October of that
year.”); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (setting case
for reargument); Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (setting case for reargument).
190. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n v. Sholly, 463 U.S. 1224 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court granted certiorari and then twice postponed oral argument
“while Congress considered proposed legislation”).
191. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
192. Id. at 52.
193. Id. at 60.
194. Id. at 76 (“The establishment of such courts does not fall within any of the historically
recognized situations in which the general principle of independent adjudication commanded by
Art[icle] III does not apply.”).
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effectuate the legislative purpose” 195—but it also understood that the
wholesale invalidation of the nation’s bankruptcy courts could cause
significant disruption. Thus, with no discussion at all, the Court decided
to “stay [its] judgment until October 4, 1982 [ninety days],” explaining
that “[t]his limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to
reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of
adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the
bankruptcy laws.” 196
The Court adopted the same approach to remedy in Buckley v.
Valeo. 197 There, the Court held unconstitutional “limitations on
campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and
groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds.” 198
The Court also held that “most of the powers conferred by the Act upon
the Federal Election Commission can be exercised only by ‘Officers of
the United States,’ appointed in conformity with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the
Constitution, and therefore cannot be exercised by the Commission as
presently constituted.” 199 The Court provided that its “mandate shall
issue forthwith, except that our judgment is stayed, for a period not to
exceed 30 days, insofar as it affects the authority of the Commission to
exercise the duties and powers granted it under the Act.” 200 As the Court
explained, “[t]his limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to
reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement
mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the
Court sustains, allowing the present Commission in the interim to
function de facto in accordance with the substantive provisions of the
Act.” 201
It might seem odd for the Court to permit the continued enforcement
of laws even after it has declared them unconstitutional. After all, as the
Supreme Court has explained, when plaintiffs come into court asserting
that their rights are being violated, those rights are “present rights; they
195. Id. at 87 n.40.
196. Id. at 88.
197. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
198. Id. at 143.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 144.
201. Id. at 143 (emphasis in original); see also Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The
Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The
Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 381 (1987) (“The stay explicitly
allowed ‘the present Commission’ to complete unfinished business pending at the time of Buckley
and to ‘afford Congress an opportunity’ to remedy the constitutional defects contained in the
Commission’s manner of appointment.”).
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are not merely hopes to some future enjoyment of some formalistic
constitutional promise. The basic guarantees of our Constitution are
warrants for the here and now and, unless there is an overwhelmingly
compelling reason, they are to be promptly fulfilled.” 202 In fact, the
Court recently expressed hesitation about the appropriateness of
“stay[ing] a lower court judgment in light of unenacted legislation,”
explaining that its “task is to rule on what the law is, not what it might
eventually be.” 203 But in that case the Court was being asked to stay a
case because future legislation might change the result in that case, not
to allow policymakers an opportunity to respond to the Court’s decision.
And, notably, the Court in that case did not foreclose the possibility that
there might be some situations in which a stay would be permissible in
light of proposed legislation. 204 While there may be instances in which
the continued enforcement of an unconstitutional law seems too
problematic to permit this solution, it should still be something the Court
considers. In some circumstances, the benefits of a stay may outweigh
its costs.
3.

Second-Best Preferences

As the preceding sections suggest, it should generally fall to
policymakers to replace invalidated laws with new policies that
represent their second-best preferences: that is, their next preferred
policy option after the one that has been held unconstitutional. Courts,
after all, are institutionally ill-equipped to make policy, 205 and while the
Court need not be passive in this enterprise, its role should be limited to
facilitating policymakers’ ability to respond, rather than responding
itself.
There may, however, be occasions in which it is appropriate for the
Court not simply to displace legislative judgments, but instead to replace
them, putting in place the policies that it believes the legislators who
enacted the invalidated provision would have enacted had they known
their preferred policy outcome was unconstitutional. Such an action, if
202. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963); cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 631 n.245
(1984) (describing “the Court’s assertion that it could continue in effect for an interim period an
allocation of judicial authority that it had found Congress could not constitutionally enact” as “[n]ot
the least surprising aspect of the decision” in Northern Construction).
203. Garcia v. Texas, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011) (per curiam).
204. See id. (“Even if there were circumstances under which a stay could issue in light of
proposed legislation, this case would not present them.”).
205. See supra Part II.A.
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successful, would immediately ameliorate the democratic disruptions of
the act of judicial review. Moreover, it would address the temporal
difficulties posed by the fact that the specific Congress whose legislative
judgment is being displaced may no longer exist and may thus be unable
to respond by putting in place its second-best preference. 206
This solution may seem like an unconventional one for a court, but in
fact, it is not that different from what the Court already occasionally
does under the guise of severability analysis. When the Court engages in
severability analysis, it sometimes does more than what this name
suggests—simply severing one part of a law from the rest. 207 Rather, the
Court produces a law that is significantly different from the one that
existed before the Court acted—advisory guidelines where they were
once mandatory, 208 or agency officials who can be removed at will
where once they could only be removed for cause.209 These decisions in
effect represent the Court’s effort to put in place policymakers’ secondbest preferences, or at least something that will approximate those
preferences until policymakers are able to respond to the Court’s
decision.
To be sure, there is always a danger in the Court guessing what
legislators or regulators would have done had they known that their
preferred outcome was unconstitutional; the Court could misjudge what
Congress would have wanted. But the Court could also be wrong about
what Congress would have wanted if it strikes down a law and puts
nothing in its place. The greater danger may be less that the Court will
guess wrong than that the Court will damage its institutional reputation
when it engages in such action. And perhaps for that reason alone this
means of addressing judicial review should be pursued rarely and only
when there is real reason to have confidence about what policymakers’
second-best preferences would be. But, again, there may be cases in
which it is appropriate, and the Court will not know that unless it
systematically considers this option when it engages in judicial review.
206. Cf. Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem,
106 NW. U.L. REV. 1201, 1229–30 (2012) (discussing these intertemporal complications).
207. See supra note 63; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885 (2005) (“Intuitively, application severability may seem a judicial
endeavor of more dubious legitimacy than text severability, as a court must draw lines not found in
the statute’s language. In fact, however, severing unconstitutional applications is functionally
equivalent to the well-established judicial practice of narrowly construing statutory provisions to
avoid constitutional problems.”).
208. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
209. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010).
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Changing Congress (and Other Policymakers)

It takes two to tango, and all of the responsibility for addressing the
greater-than-necessary democratic disruptions caused by judicial review
should not fall on the courts. To the contrary, there are steps the
policymaking branches can—and should—also take to help reduce these
disruptions. In some cases, these reforms may be particularly effective if
adopted in conjunction with one of the judicial reforms discussed
above. 210 Again, none of these solutions is perfect—each has costs—but
we should at least consider whether the adoption of these tools in the
right circumstances will help address the greater-than-necessary
democratic disruptions that judicial review produces.
1.

Fallback Law

Congress occasionally provides guidance in its legislation about what
should happen should the law be declared unconstitutional, in full or in
part. Most commonly, this guidance takes the form of severability
provisions, which instruct courts about what to do when just one
provision of a larger law is held unconstitutional—that is, strike down
the law in its totality, or leave the rest of the law in place. 211 But
sometimes Congress goes even farther and enacts “substantive fallback
provisions.” 212 These substantive fallback provisions—i.e., new
provisions of substantive law—automatically go into effect when the
law to which they are attached is held unconstitutional. 213 For example,
to take one of the very simple examples discussed above, the law barring
tobacco advertising within 1000 feet of schools could have included a
substantive fallback provision of a 250-foot ban. Or it might have
provided for some other policy designed to address under-age smoking.
Thus, substantive fallback provisions essentially enable policymakers’
second-best preferences to automatically go into effect, without delay
and without the courts having to guess what those second-best
preferences would have been. That is a real benefit, and Congress should
more often consider whether to include substantive fallback provisions
when it has reason to suspect the law it is enacting might be held
210. For example, as I discuss below, Congress could adopt rules that allow for expedited
proceedings in the aftermath of a judicial decision. That reform—in conjunction with a judicial stay
for a defined period of time—could allow for expeditious policy response without the disruption
ever going into effect.
211. See supra note 63.
212. Dorf, supra note 44, at 305.
213. Id.
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unconstitutional.
As I noted earlier, Michael Dorf has discussed the existence of such
provisions at length, including the potential problems posed by the use
of substantive fallback provisions. Among other things, Dorf discusses
the extent to which a fallback provision’s relationship with the
invalidated provision may (or may not) affect the analysis of the
fallback’s constitutionality. 214 For my purposes, there are two problems
in particular that make substantive fallback provisions an incomplete
solution to the problems of ex post judicial review. First, in a world of
limited time and in which enacting legislation is exceedingly difficult, it
is simply unrealistic to expect that policymakers will enact substantive
fallback provisions for every piece of legislation they enact, or even
every piece of legislation which seems particularly likely to be subject to
constitutional challenge. In many cases, the enactment of the fallback
provision will be a waste of time and effort if the underlying provision is
never held unconstitutional. Second, when policymakers write a
substantive fallback provision, they cannot know the nuances of the
Court decision that will trigger it. In other words, they are legislating
their response without the benefit of knowing why the Court held the
underlying provision unconstitutional, which may affect what they put in
place in response. 215
Thus, substantive fallback law does not offer a complete solution to
the problem of judicial review’s greater-than-necessary democratic
disruptions. But that does not mean that it cannot be valuable in certain
circumstances. For example, where it is especially likely that the
underlying provision may be held unconstitutional (and especially where
Congress can anticipate the possible grounds of a Court ruling),
Congress should seriously consider enacting fallback provisions.
2.

Expedited Proceedings

As discussed above, Congress is not an institution that is known for
its ability to respond nimbly to rapidly developing events. 216 For good or
for bad, legislative response generally takes time. But whatever one
214. Id. at 313–25.
215. Id. at 347–48 (“Those who believe that the Court and the political branches should be
engaged in dialogue about constitutional meaning have their own reasons to be skeptical of fallback
law . . . . How can the legislature take the views of the courts into account in formulating its own
response if it formulates that response before learning those views?”). See generally Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 655–79 (1993) (discussing the
dialogic function of judicial review).
216. See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text.
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thinks of that fact as a general matter—whether one views it as
destructive gridlock or measured deliberation—it is arguably more
problematic where judicial intervention has produced disruptions to
democratic preferences that are not constitutionally required.
Significantly, though, much of the reason that legislative and
regulatory action is generally slow in coming is a function not of
constitutional imperative, but of Congress’s own making (i.e., the
internal rules that govern its own proceedings and the statutory rules that
govern administrative proceedings). 217 Thus, Congress could change
those rules to allow for more expeditious response, at least in the
aftermath of a judicial decision. For example, to address legislative
delays, Congress could eliminate the filibuster and other procedural
hurdles, or lessen the amount of debate required before a vote can
happen. 218 To address administrative delays, Congress might lessen the
strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act, such as full notice-andcomment. 219
To be sure, this reform will not help in those circumstances where
current policymakers are not inclined to respond. Moreover, to those
who believe that the system’s design is essential to thorough deliberation
and measured response, this cure may seem worse than the disease. But,
again, the benefits of such an approach may still outweigh the costs, at
least in some cases. And allowing for more expeditious action will not
mean that action always occurs or without any deliberation. After all, at
least on the legislative side, any response will still require enactment by
both houses of Congress and presentment to the President.
3.

Housekeeping

One of the most pernicious aspects of the democratic disruptions that
are at the focus of this Article is the lack of transparency. Even when the
Court’s decision is the focus of substantial attention, the nature and
scope of the greater-than-necessary democratic disruptions that it
produces may not always be obvious. To return to the example of

217. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gerson & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121
HARV. L. REV. 543, 553 (2007) (discussing internal rules that both speed, and delay, legislative
action).
218. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 85, at 1418 (discussing the filibuster); Charles A. Stevenson, In
Senate, ‘Motion to Proceed’ Should Be Non-Debatable, ROLL CALL (Apr. 19, 2010, Midnight),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/55_117/-45256-1.html (discussing possible reforms to the “motion
to proceed”).
219. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008).
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Citizens United, the decision was hardly a secret—to the contrary, it was
one of the most high-profile cases in recent memory—but it was still not
immediately clear to even close observers of the Court what exactly the
consequences of the decision would be, beyond the obvious influx of
greater corporate and union spending. 220
One way to ensure that these democratic disruptions do not go
unnoticed would be for policymakers to decide in advance to engage in
regular housekeeping of certain statutory schemes—either ones that are
particularly complicated, or ones in which judicial intervention seems
particularly likely. In these periods of regular statutory housekeeping,
policymakers can study whether judicial decisions (or even other
external developments) make changes to the underlying scheme
necessary and then can take whatever action is appropriate.
Of course, housekeeping will (again) only address those disruptions
that policymakers want to address. And housekeeping will only address
them after the fact—the disruptions will still go into effect, which can
itself make legislative response more difficult. 221 Finally, some might
object that policymakers should not expend time and effort reviewing
statutory schemes that may ultimately require no revisions or changes at
all. But, again, there may be some schemes in which a regular review
(which can be relatively quick if there have been no relevant changes in
the period since the last review) would be of real benefit.
***
These proposed reforms do not provide a complete solution to the
problem identified in this Article. That that is so speaks to the need for a
larger conversation about our system of ex post judicial review and
whether it compromises the ability of the courts and policymakers to
effectively work together. But these reforms may, at least in certain
cases, help ameliorate the problem of these greater-than-necessary
democratic disruptions. If nothing else, their systematic consideration—
and even occasional adoption—would help focus attention on this larger
problem. In some ways, it is surprising that the branches (and, in
particular, the Court) have not more systematically adopted these

220. See supra note 87.
221. Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the Crossroads: Runyon,
Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J. 949, 970 n.87 (1988) (“[I]f the status
quo is created by an incorrect Supreme Court interpretation, the ‘retentionist bias’ and ‘legislative
inertia’ may keep it in place.”); cf. Gans, supra note 63, at 643–44 (“[O]nce a court has rewritten the
invalid statute via severance, it is much less likely that the legislature will act. Once a court has put
in place a revised statute, legislative inertia takes over.”).
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responses to judicial review. In the next Part, I suggest why that might
be.
V.

TIME FOR A NEW REALISM

Although the collateral consequences of judicial review are
significant in and of themselves and for what they reveal about the larger
consequences of a system of ex post judicial review, they also may be
able to teach us something about the Court and its relationship with the
world around it. Indeed, the fact that the Court recognizes the
importance of deference to the coordinate branches, yet fails to
systematically adopt some of the more modest proposals I discussed
above may suggest something important about the way the Court sees
itself (or wants others to see it).
The Court presents itself as an apolitical institution, divorced from the
worlds of politics and policy. As Judge Posner recently wrote, “Judges
tend to deny the creative—the legislative—dimension of judging,
important as it is in our system, because they do not want to give the
impression that they are competing with legislators, or engaged in
anything but the politically unthreatening activity of objective, literalminded interpretation, using arcane tools of legal analysis.” 222
The Supreme Court is no exception, and its failure to adopt the more
modest proposals I suggested above may reflect this tendency. For
example, as I noted, communication between the Court and Congress is
surprisingly rare; 223 communications between the Court and other
policymakers is largely non-existent. As then-Professor Katzmann noted
in his seminal work on the relationship between the courts and Congress,
the reason for the absence of communication may be at least partially
philosophical, reflecting “an awkward unease about communications
regarding substantive matters of policy and process [that] characterizes
relations between the first and third branches.” 224 That that benign
wariness persists may well result in significant part from the Court’s
lack of realism about its own role. Regular interactions with Congress
might suggest that the Court—like Congress—is an actor in the worlds
of politics and policy.
Likewise, the Court’s failure to stay its judgments may reflect, at least
222. Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.tnr.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textualoriginalism#).
223. See supra Part II.A.
224. KATZMANN, supra note 79, at 82.
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in part, its unwillingness to acknowledge that when it acts it often does
more than apply the law; it actually changes the law, and substantial
policy consequences often follow. Staying its judgment, after all, would
implicitly recognize that the Court is disrupting the intent of
democratically elected legislators in a way that might warrant some sort
of response from policymakers. This, in turn, could suggest that the
Court’s decisions are motivated by the justices’ political views, rather
than the law, 225 and the Court might worry that its legitimacy (and thus
its ability to function) will be harmed if it were to make its connection to
the worlds of politics and policy so apparent. 226
More sustained study is necessary, of course, to determine whether
this hypothesis is right, but if it is, it is time to take stock of what we
might be losing as a result of the Court’s unwillingness to acknowledge
the true nature of its role. After all, the Court’s lack of realism can
detrimentally affect the way it conducts its business. Here, its
unwillingness to acknowledge that its decisions can produce collateral
consequences actually magnifies those consequences by depriving the
Court of tools it could use to minimize them. As has been discussed
elsewhere, the Court’s lack of realism affects the way it engages in
factfinding, producing ad hoc factfinding that meaningfully impairs the
quality of the Court’s decisionmaking. 227
A more honest accounting of the role of the Court and the nature of its
decisions could potentially improve the way the Court operates. This is
not to say that there might not be costs. Surely, the Court maintains its
image (or struggles to do so) for a reason. Perhaps there might be some
effect on how people perceive the Court and its legitimacy. That said, it
is worth querying whether anyone today truly believes that the Court is

225. This notion would hardly be new, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993), but “the vast bulk of legal scholarship
still explicitly or implicitly assumes that court decisions are based centrally upon reasoned
arguments of the type taught in law school,” Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal
Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 251, 252 (1997).
And the perception that the justices are influenced by their political views can affect the public’s
approval of the Supreme Court’s work. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating
for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012 (noting that “the court’s standing
with the public has slipped significantly in the past quarter-century” and that this “decline in the
court’s standing . . . could reflect a sense that the court is more political”).
226. See Edward McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-Making,
39 MINN. L. REV. 837, 845 (1955) (“The end product of the [Court’s involvement in politics] must
be to embroil the Court in undignified partisan controversy, and there may be a risk too, as
happened with the Old Court majority before 1937, of the Court itself going down with a lost
political cause.”).
227. Gorod, supra note 161.
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completely apolitical. 228 A popular description of the Court that does not
mention the Court’s “liberal” wing, its “conservative” wing, and the
“moderate” in the middle is rare. If the general public recognizes that the
Court is at least sometimes political, it may be time for the Court to do
so as well, especially if doing so will improve its ability to do its job.
Although I do not purport to offer here a catalogue of ways in which the
Court’s willingness to be more realistic about its role might improve its
operations, I do think that this is a more general problem that requires
sustained attention.
CONCLUSION
The most obvious facts are sometimes the least appreciated.
Significantly, it is completely unsurprising that legislators and regulators
would make policy against the backdrop of existing laws and
regulations. Yet there has been virtually no attention paid to what that
fact means when the courts step in and disrupt that existing legal regime.
One consequence of this fact is that judicial review produces disruptions
to democratic preferences that are greater than the Constitution requires.
Although these disruptions may take different forms and raise different
concerns depending on the issue and the surrounding political context,
there is every reason to think that these disruptions occur frequently.
This Article is first and foremost a call for recognition of these
disruptions and a conversation about what they tell us about our system
of ex post judicial review. We can begin to solve the problem only if we
recognize it. But the Article also offers some preliminary thoughts on
what solutions might look like. Most significantly, the Article argues
that we should think about whether it would be possible to move toward
a system of ex ante judicial review in which we try to prevent the
enactment of unconstitutional laws and regulations, rather than simply
invalidating them after the fact. While moving toward a system of ex
ante judicial review would require working through difficult
constitutional and practical questions, I do not think these problems are
insurmountable, and I hope to work through them and comprehensively
sketch out what such a system might look like in a future project.
In the meantime, I argue that there are more interim reforms that both
the Court and the coordinate branches could adopt to help address these
issues. None of these reforms is perfect, but in some cases, the benefits
they offer may outweigh the costs. At minimum, the systematic
228. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 225 (reporting that three-quarters of Americans “say the
justices’ decisions are sometimes influenced by their personal or political views”).
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consideration of these solutions would help shine light on the larger
problem and thus make possible a more complete solution. The Court’s
reluctance to adopt even these modest solutions may reflect its
unwillingness to acknowledge the very real role that it plays in the
worlds of policy and politics. But the only way that the Court can
effectively do its job—in this and other respects—is if it acknowledges
all aspects of what that job is.
It is time not only to acknowledge the greater-than-necessary
democratic disruptions that judicial review produces, but also how the
Court’s role in governance produces those disruptions. Sometimes the
most obvious facts are the least appreciated. There is much about the
Court and its role that is obvious, and yet little appreciated. Recognizing
the reality of the Court’s role is a critical prerequisite to ensuring that the
Court fills that role effectively.

